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Articles
REFORMING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
Derek W. Black
ABSTRACT—Public schools suspend millions of students each year, but
less than ten percent of suspensions are for serious misbehavior. School
leaders argue that these suspensions ensure an orderly educational
environment for those students who remain. Social science demonstrates
the opposite. The practice of regularly suspending students negatively
affects misbehaving students as well as innocent bystanders. All things
being equal, schools that manage student behavior through means other
than suspension produce the highest achieving students. In this respect, the
quality of education a school provides is closely connected to its discipline
policies.
Reformers have largely overlooked the connection between discipline
and educational quality. This oversight has limited theoretical and practical
tools for change. On the theoretical side, reformers miss the opportunity to
pit harsh discipline as the enemy of good schools. Instead, they fall victim
to the narrative of bad students as the enemy of good ones. On the practical
side, they miss the opportunity to demand legal reform. Instead, they
relegate themselves to asking schools to voluntarily adopt less severe
discipline policies. Thus far, voluntary efforts have produced some
significant changes, but the changes are isolated and limited in scope. In
short, reformers need new legal theories and tools to demand reform.
Otherwise, harsh discipline will remain the dominant paradigm for the
foreseeable future and efforts to improve educational quality and
achievement—the most pressing item on the national agenda of the day—
will continue to fall short.
While some scholars have proposed limits on the most egregious
discipline policies, this Article is the first to offer a legal theory that would
substantively reform school discipline on the whole and improve
educational quality. The theory is grounded in the affirmative education
rights and duties found in state constitutions. These rights and duties give
rise to two distinct but interrelated arguments. First, because students have
a constitutionally protected individual right to education, suspensions and
expulsions should trigger heightened scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny would
not bar suspensions, but it would force states to justify the efficacy of
suspension. The practical result would be to prompt states to adopt
1
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pedagogically sound approaches to student misbehavior. Second, discipline
practices that undermine educational quality violate states’ constitutional
obligation to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities to all
students. In these instances, state constitutions should obligate states to
intervene with reform. Unlike past strategies, these two steps can ensure
discipline reform and educational quality improvements that normally
prove elusive.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
I would like to thank Professors Josie Brown, Barbara Fedders, and Jason
Nance for their comments and suggestions; Dean Robert Wilcox for his
support of my research; and Abigail Carson for her research assistance.
Most of all, I would like to thank Moon Hee Lee and Matthew Fisher of the
Northwestern University Law Review editorial board. Their substantive
contributions, both big and small, improved the article far more than any
others’ in the past.
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INTRODUCTION
By short-term suspension or semester- and year-long expulsion, public
schools exclude about three and a half million students a year.1 Since the
1970s, many students’ chances of exclusion have doubled and tripled.2
Each African-American student who passes through the halls of a middle or
high school in the fall has nearly a one-in-four chance of being suspended
or expelled by the spring.3 Some schools today will actually hand out more
total suspensions than they have students, suspending some students
multiple times.4 This dramatic spike results from schools increasingly
suspending and expelling students for relatively minor misbehavior. Today,
less than ten percent of suspensions and expulsions are for weapons,
violence, or drug-related behavior.5 The rest are for misbehavior that in the
past would have been dealt with informally. This represents a shift in
discipline philosophy itself—from discipline responses designed to
improve students’ behavior to punitive responses that “demonstrate
toughness and reassure the public that [school officials] are in control.”6

1

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, DATA
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2 (2014), http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Downloads/CRDC-School-DisciplineSnapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH78-N72B].
2
DANIEL LOSEN ET AL., CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES, ARE WE CLOSING THE SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE GAP? 6 (2015), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rightsremedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/are-we-closing-the-school-disciplinegap/AreWeClosingTheSchoolDisciplineGap_FINAL221.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2PH-2F24].
3
Id.
4
EVERY STUDENT EVERY DAY COAL., DISTRICT DISCIPLINE: THE OVERUSE OF SCHOOL
SUSPENSION
AND
EXPULSION
IN
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
4
(2013),
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/DC_District-Discipline-Overuse-of-School-Suspension-andExpulsion-in-DC_DCLY_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZVV-S5D7].
5
See, e.g., CONN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS IN CONNECTICUT 33
(2015), http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/deps/sctg/suspensions_and_expulsions_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LX8-2J8B]; see also DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, CTR. FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS REMEDIES, OUT OF SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN AMERICAN
MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS 1, 20 (2013), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/centerfor-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/out-of-school-and-off-track-theoveruse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-schools/OutofSchool-OffTrack_UCLA_4-8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5U5C-U7GN] (reviewing national discipline data and finding that “most out-of-school
suspensions are for minor offenses”). In some instances, drugs and weapons account for less than five
percent of suspensions and expulsions. M. Karega Rausch & Russell Skiba, Unplanned Outcomes:
Suspensions and Expulsions in Indiana, EDUC. POL’Y BRIEFS (Ctr. for Evaluation & Educ. Policy,
Bloomington, Ind.), Summer 2004, at 2, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED488917.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4FA-BRUG]; Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Rethinking School Discipline,
Remarks at the Release of the Joint DOJ-ED School Discipline Guidance Package (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/rethinking-school-discipline
[https://perma.cc/7TZD-QPK7]
(indicating as much as 95% of school exclusions are for nonviolent behavior).
6
Pedro A. Noguera, Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to
School Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 190 (1995).
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This entails “rigid[ly] and inflexibl[y] . . . meting out punishment upon
students who violate school rules,” regardless of the infraction.7
The effects of this shift are far-reaching for both individual students
and the overall education system. Data increasingly shows that the frequent
use of suspension and expulsion to control student behavior creates a
negative learning environment that incentivizes misbehavior and depresses
overall academic achievement.8 For the struggling student, punitive
disciplinary environments may produce more misbehavior, not less.9 When
schools suspend or expel these students, the next step for a significant
number will eventually be the juvenile justice system.10 Moreover, the
result is not to create a better learning environment for well-behaved
students. To the contrary, punitive discipline undermines educational
outcomes for well-behaved students as well.11
For the past decade, advocates, researchers, and a few policymakers
have worked feverishly to end punitive discipline and slow the so-called
school-to-prison pipeline.12 The strategy has involved two steps. The first
step has been to emphasize the staggering raw data on school suspensions
and law enforcement referrals, hoping to shame schools into reform.13 The
second step emphasizes the availability of discipline models that help
7

Id.
See, e.g., M. KAREGA RAUSCH & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, THE ACADEMIC COST OF DISCIPLINE: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUSPENSION/EXPULSION AND SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 19–20 (2005)
(conducting two different regression analyses that showed that the use of “suspension and expulsion is
negatively related to achievement, even when socio-demographic variables are held constant”); see also
infra notes 248–75.
9
See infra notes 261–65, 280–84.
10
See generally Susan Ferriss, Virginia Tops Nation in Sending Students to Cops, Courts: Where
Does Your State Rank?, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (last updated Feb. 19, 2016)
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/10/17089/virginia-tops-nation-sending-students-cops-courtswhere-does-your-state-rank [https://perma.cc/LE97-4TB3] (reporting that nearly 16 in every 1000
Virginia students were referred to law enforcement).
11
See, e.g., Brea L. Perry & Edward W. Morris, Suspending Progress: Collateral Consequences of
Exclusionary Punishment in Public Schools, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1067, 1068 (2014); RAUSCH & SKIBA,
supra note 8, at 19.
12
See, e.g., JUDITH A. BROWNE, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, DERAILED!: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO
JAILHOUSE TRACK 30 (2003) (calling on schools to reduce harsh discipline policies and referrals to law
enforcement); LOSEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 34 (calling on schools to close the discipline gap);
Motoko Rich, Obama to Report Widening of Initiative for Black and Latino Boys: My Brother’s Keeper
Program Grows to Include More Impoverished Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/education/obamas-my-brothers-keeper-education-program-expa
nds.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/C6C2-S5MR] (describing presidential initiative to improve life
outcomes for African-American and Latino boys, including by improving discipline policies).
13
For instance, after a national study identified Oklahoma City public schools as among the very
worst in the nation in terms of suspension rates, the district immediately responded with an audit of its
discipline data and a promise to implement reform. Ben Felder, OKC School Suspension Rates Are
Among Highest in the Nation, OKLA. GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://okgazette.com/2015/03/04/okcschool-suspension-rates-are-among-highest-in-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/U6E4-XJWD].
8
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students make better decisions and avoid misbehavior in the first instance,
trusting that conscientious schools will adopt best practices.14 While these
efforts have achieved promising results in several locations,15 positive
results remain isolated and harsh discipline remains dominant.16
The inability of reformers to identify a legal basis to demand
meaningful change in court has slowed progress. While existing precedent
clearly protects students’ right to certain procedures prior to punishment,17
it has done very little to force schools to rethink the basic justifications for
suspending and expelling students.18 Currently, reformers’ primary option
is to pursue administrative remedies with the U.S. Department of
Education. Administrative remedies, however, are limited in scope. In
2014, the Department announced a new discipline policy, but the
Department only has authority to limit egregious racial disparities in school
discipline, not punitive discipline in general.19 Equally problematic, the
new policy is subject to discretionary underenforcement and retraction at
any time.
Recognizing the need for legal remedies, scholars have theorized
constitutional limits on the most egregious forms of school discipline and
zero tolerance.20 But no one has articulated a broad legal theory for
holistically reforming school discipline or connecting discipline policies to
education quality. This Article offers that theory, challenging school
exclusions and negative educational environments based on the rights and
14

For a full discussion of the tools states and schools might adopt to improve discipline outcomes,
see Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313
(2016).
15
See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe, LAUSD to Decriminalize Student Fights, Petty Thefts and Minor
Offenses, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014, 7:52 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lausdto-decriminalize-student-fights-petty-thefts-minor-offenses-20140819-story.html
[https://perma.cc/
J874-TLR6]; Tom Mela, How We Won School Discipline Reform in Massachusetts, NAT’L
OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN CAMPAIGN (July 23, 2014), http://www.otlcampaign.org/blog/
2014/07/23/how-we-won-school-discipline-reform-massachusetts [https://perma.cc/258G-HEJK].
16
See, e.g., Derek Black, California Limits School Suspensions: Did It Do Enough?, EDUC. L.
PROF. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2014/10/california-limitsschool-suspensions-did-it-do-enough.html [https://perma.cc/V55D-6RSA].
17
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
18
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823,
841–66 (2015) (explaining how U.S. Supreme Court precedent fell far short of its intended result of
reforming school discipline).
19
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Nondiscriminatory
Administration of School Discipline 11–12 (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHA7-RWUU].
20
See, e.g., Black, supra note 18, at 828; Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re
Out? Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 108
(2003); Aaron Sussman, Learning in Lockdown: School Police, Race, and the Limits of Law, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 788, 831–35 (2012); Robyn K. Bitner, Note, Exiled from Education: Plyler v. Doe’s Impact on
the Constitutionality of Long-Term Suspensions and Expulsions, 101 VA. L. REV. 763, 767 (2015).
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duties that grow out of education clauses found in state constitutions.21
These rights and duties give rise to two distinct, but interrelated claims.
One claim is based on an excluded student’s individual right to education.
The other is based on states’ general duty to provide equal and adequate
educational opportunities.22
The first claim posits that suspensions and expulsions should trigger
heightened scrutiny. Over the past forty years, the right to education has
changed substantially. Initially, courts treated education as a statutory right,
subject to no more than rational basis review under federal law. Now,
education has achieved a constitutional status under state law, with courts
recognizing education as a constitutional right of students or a
constitutional duty of states and requiring school funding and quality
reforms in more than half of the states.23 This precedent supports the
proposition that students have an individual constitutional right to
education under state constitutions that schools cannot simply take away
without meeting some form of heightened scrutiny.24 Heightened scrutiny
would require an important or compelling reason for taking that right away,
along with a showing that suspension and expulsion are substantially
related or narrowly tailored to achieving those goals.25 With serious
misbehaviors, schools could easily meet this standard in most
circumstances, leaving current practices in place.26 But schools’ unfettered

21

See generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–05 (2007) (discussing the results in state
cases and the substantive meaning of the constitutional right to education in those cases); William E.
Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1666 (1989) (providing an overview of the various education
clauses in state constitutions).
22
Some states recognize a right to an equal and an adequate education, while others recognize a
right to only one or the other. For the purposes of this Article, those distinctions are unimportant and,
thus, this Article uses the phrase adequate and equal education for ease and readability. For more on the
unimportance of this distinction, see Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy,
66 STAN. L. REV. 477 (2014).
23
Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step
Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1397 (2010).
24
See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255–56 (N.C. 1997); Sch. Dist. of Wilkinsburg v.
Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va.
1994); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391–95 (Vt. 1997). This Article uses the phrase “heightened
scrutiny” to refer to strict and intermediate scrutiny collectively. While strict scrutiny is the general
default for violations of fundamental and other constitutional rights, courts do not uniformly apply it in
all instances.
25
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976); Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 346–47 (W. Va. 1997) (quoting Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 918 (W. Va. 1996) (McHugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
26
See generally King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259 (N.C.
2010) (discussing how strict school discipline policy would pass rational basis, intermediate, and strict
scrutiny review).

6
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authority to remove students for misbehavior as minor as class disruption
would be severely restricted.
The individualized rights claim, however, might only serve to bring
suspension rates down. It would not necessarily ensure substantive
educational and disciplinary reform that improves educational outcomes for
everyone; a school could just stop suspending students and do nothing to
improve the disciplinary environment. This could partially salvage the
education of some students, but undermine the education of others. To
ensure broader reforms, disciplinary theories must also incorporate states’
systematic constitutional duties in education—the basis for the second
claim type.
The second claim posits that discipline policies and practices that
significantly undermine the quality of education a school offers violate the
state’s constitutional education duty. State constitutions obligate states to
provide equal and adequate educational opportunities to all students.27
Empirical evidence indicates that schools cannot consistently deliver equal
and adequate education opportunities without also ensuring effective
discipline policy.28 Dysfunctional disciplinary environments deprive all
students, including well-behaved students, of access to equal and adequate
educational opportunities. When this occurs, state education clauses
obligate states to intervene with reforms that improve discipline and,
thereby, the quality of education.
This second claim has greater potential to transform the debate over
school discipline. Too often the current debate pits “good” students against
“bad” ones.29 The interests of good students will almost always win this
battle, which means schools will continue to single out “bad” students and
set them on the schoolhouse-to-jailhouse path. This framing, however,
incorrectly assumes that misbehaving students’ interests are adverse to
everyone else’s interests. This Article reframes the debate by focusing on
the close connection between educational quality and discipline policy. By
emphasizing how punitive discipline undermines educational quality in

27

Rebell, supra note 21, at 1515.
See infra notes 249–76, 320–49.
29
See, e.g., Ben Wolfgang, Obama Administration Guidelines Could Lead to Racial Quotas in
School Discipline, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/8/
white-house-to-offer-new-rules-school-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/Y7PX-KA6S] (addressing the
concern that new suspension guidelines will cause administrators to overlook bad behavior by
minorities); Teresa Watanabe & Howard Blume, Why Some LAUSD Teachers Are Balking at a New
Approach to Discipline Problems, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/
education/la-me-school-discipline-20151108-story.html [https://perma.cc/9RKF-KGA6] (indicating that
some teachers believe the new approach to discipline is preventing them from disciplining students who
need it).
28

7
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general, this Article targets punitive discipline as the enemy of quality
educational opportunities and, thus, the interests of all students. With that
framing, non-punitive approaches to discipline that emphasize positive
reinforcement for appropriate behavior and early individualized
interventions for students showing signs of misbehavior become a strategy
to improve overall educational outcomes.
This Article develops this argument in three parts. Part I outlines the
historical development of the state constitutional right to education and
states’ duty to deliver it, including the theoretical and doctrinal principles
developed in past litigation. Of particular importance is courts’ recognition
that academic outcomes depend on two factors: students’ individual
capabilities and disadvantages, and schools’ responses to them. The state
may not be able to control the former, but it is entirely responsible for the
latter. Thus, when students systemically fail to succeed in school, courts
have rejected states’ attempts to blame students—or even local school
personnel—and reasoned that the state has a responsibility to offer students
the support necessary to succeed.30
Part II examines the few cases that have attempted to use school
finance precedent in the context of school discipline and identifies the
flaws in that litigation. Overall, these cases are a story of bad facts making
bad law. Rather than challenging suspensions for minor misbehavior,
plaintiffs in these cases have sought access to alternative schools for
students who engaged in serious misbehavior.31 In this context, courts have
either avoided or misunderstood the central questions of whether education
is a constitutional right and what justifications suffice for taking it away.
Part II ends with answers to those questions and outlines the appropriate
framework for bringing and adjudicating claims on behalf of suspended
and expelled students. In particular, it argues that the most compelling case
on behalf of students has yet to be made: states lack a sufficient
justification to exclude students from regular school for extended periods
of time when all they have done is engage in minor misbehavior.
Part III shifts from individual rights analysis to the state’s duty to
deliver adequate and equal education opportunities for all students. First, it
establishes the factual predicate that discipline policy affects educational
30

Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State,
599 S.E.2d 365, 390–91 (N.C. 2004) (indicating state had failed to identify and support at-risk
students); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 179 (S.C. 2014) (emphasizing the need to
address the current reality in which the state “creat[es] school districts filled with students of the most
disadvantaged socioeconomic background, exposing students in those school districts to substandard
educational inputs, and then maintaining that nothing can be done to improve those school districts’
unacceptable performances”).
31
See, e.g., King, 704 S.E.2d at 260; In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115–17 (Miss. 1996).

8
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opportunity. It does so through social science studies finding a statistical
correlation between discipline policy, educational quality, and student
achievement. Those studies establish that: (1) negative school climates
incentivize more misbehavior;32 (2) the discipline decisions school officials
make shape school climate; and (3) school climate affects student
achievement and largely explains the achievement gap between students at
predominantly low-income school and middle-income schools.33 Part III
situates these findings within school quality and finance precedent, arguing
that states have an affirmative obligation to reform discipline policy and
improve disciplinary environments. Part III ends by briefly comparing the
individual rights approach to discipline to the duty-based approach. It
concludes that a duty-based claim is the strongest of the two, but that the
claims should be jointly pursued.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION
A. Historical Evolution

In 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education,34 the U.S. Supreme Court
wrote that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments . . . [and] it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.”35 Yet, the Court refrained from recognizing education as a
fundamental right.36 When that issue was squarely before the Court nearly
two decades later in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,37 the Court held that education is not a fundamental right, and
poverty-based discrimination in education is only subject to rational basis
review.38 With this defeat, advocates abandoned federal courts as a venue
for school finance litigation claims arguing that inequities in education
resources and quality violated students’ constitutional rights. Instead,
advocates brought future claims exclusively in state courts.39

32

See infra notes 262–66.
See, e.g., Richard Arum & Melissa Velez, Class and Racial Differences in U.S. School
Disciplinary Environments, in IMPROVING LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 298–302 (Richard Arum & Melissa Velez
eds., 2012).
34
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35
Id. at 493.
36
Id. (indicating equality applies only “where the state has undertaken to provide [education]”).
37
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38
Id. at 28–29, 35.
39
Black, supra note 23, at 1360–61.
33

9
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The state claims were theoretically and factually the same as those in
Rodriguez, but differed in one key aspect: the state claims were based on
education clauses in state constitutions.40 In contrast to the federal
Constitution’s silence on education, state constitutions affirmatively
obligate states to do certain things, the most important of which is to
deliver education.41 In fact, all fifty state constitutions specifically mandate
that the state establish and maintain public schools.42
Litigation based on these education clauses succeeded immediately. In
1973, just weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that funding inequities violated
students’ state constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” education.43
Three years later, the Supreme Court of California held that the California
Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to education and that funding
inequities violated that right.44 Over the next decade, courts in several other
states followed with similar holdings.45
In the 1980s, school finance litigation began to focus more heavily on
quality and less on formal equity.46 Some began to question the potential
limits of equity theory and noted that many state constitutions contained
rich language that spoke to the quality of education.47 During this same
period, “standards-based reform” was occurring in education policy, which
40

See generally Thro, supra note 21, at 1657–70 (describing state education clauses and their role
in litigation).
41
Id. at 1667–68 (“By their texts, the Category IV clauses impose the greatest obligation on the
state legislature. Typically, they provide that education is ‘fundamental,’ ‘primary,’ or ‘paramount.’”).
42
The official number of state constitutions imposing an education duty or right has varied between
forty-nine and fifty over the past half-century based on Mississippi’s constitutional vacillations. The
Mississippi Constitution of 1890 imposed upon the state to establish a uniform system of public
schools, but that obligation was erased from the constitution in 1960 as a reaction to Brown v. Board of
Education. Hon. Michael P. Mills & William Quin, II, The Right to a “Minimally Adequate Education”
as Guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1521, 1525–26 (1998); see also T.H.
Freeland, III et al., Seeking Educational Funding Equity in Mississippi: “I Asked for Water, You Gave
Me Gasoline,” 58 MISS. L.J. 247, 258–59 (1988). In 1987, Mississippi amended its constitution again in
a way that could be read to reestablish a duty on the state. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 (“The
Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of free public
schools upon such conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.”).
43
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294–95 (N.J. 1973), reheard as to remedy, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975).
44
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (clarifying and reaffirming its pre-Rodriguez
holding).
45
See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978);
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
46
Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION
FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 34, 53–56 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
47
Id.
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lent support to the notion that states should improve basic quality in
education.48 Prompted by reports, national summits, and popular media
charging that students in the United States were not mastering core
educational concepts and were falling behind their international
counterparts, states began developing core academic standards that all
students would be required to meet.49
Those academic standards and students’ scores on tests of those
standards soon found their way into plaintiffs’ legal claims. Plaintiffs
argued that state constitutional phrases such as “efficient,” “thorough,” and
“sound basic” education obligated states to provide children with a quality
education that could be measured through the academic standards and tests
that states had developed.50 For instance, in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc.,51 the Kentucky Supreme Court became the first to fully
articulate a qualitative right to education, holding that a constitutionally
adequate or “efficient” education included several specific skills and
outcomes in each of the major subjects of school curriculum.52 Numerous
other state courts borrowed from Rose’s standards or followed Rose’s
approach in defining their own.53 With these litigation successes and the
continued emphasis on standards-based learning, quality-based litigation
quickly became, and has since remained, a dominant theory in
constitutional education litigation.54
Equity litigation, however, did not abruptly end. Instead, the lines
between “equity” and “adequacy” litigation have increasingly blurred in
recent decades.55 Litigants now often include both theories in their claims.56
48

Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 555–63
(1992) (describing the perceived crisis in academic standards in public schools and the effort to reform
them).
49
Joetta L. Sack, The End of an Education Presidency, EDUC. WK., Jan. 17, 2001.
50
Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 46, at 52.
51
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
52
Id. at 212.
53
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165–66 (Ala. 1993); Lake View Sch. Dist. No.
25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 485 (Ark. 2002), mandate recalled by 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004);
Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993); McDuffy v. Sec’y
of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997);
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999).
54
See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 17, Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Haslam, (Tenn. Ch. Aug. 31, 2015) (No.
15-1048III); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014).
55
William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of the
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185,
1187–88, 1283–96 (2003) (explaining that no clear line divides equality theories from adequacy
theories and that, in fact, both theories are present in most education finance cases); Weishart, supra
note 22, at 478–81.

11

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Moreover, while the terms adequate, equal, and quality education are
theoretically distinct, scholars have demonstrated that the functional
differences between these phrases are not that significant.57 The factual
circumstances that would support a violation of any of these rights are
generally the same.58 Even where some functional differences might exist,
they are not pertinent to this Article’s arguments. The main point for this
Article is simply to highlight the litigation success that followed the advent
of adequacy theories. Rose marked the beginning of twenty-seven school
finance cases—most of them premised on adequacy—that would be filed
between 1989 and 2006.59 Plaintiffs prevailed in nearly 75% of those cases,
as compared to the less than 50% success rate prior to Rose.60 While school
finance litigation took a brief respite during the Great Recession, numerous
cases have been filed in the last few years.61
B. Doctrinal and Theoretical Principles
1. The Creation of Rights and Duties.—Several important ideas and
principles developed in school finance litigation have direct bearing on
school discipline. The most obvious is that a majority of state courts have
held that education clauses in state constitutions create rights or duties.62
Some courts ask whether education is a fundamental right and, if so, apply
strict scrutiny to state policies and practices that create unequal access to
educational opportunity.63 Other courts ask whether the state constitution
obligates the legislature to ensure certain educational opportunities and, if
so, whether the state has carried out that duty.64 For the purposes of this
56

See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 764 (Kan. 2006) (addressing both equity and adequacy
concerns).
57
Weishart, supra note 22, at 482.
58
Id.
59
Rebell, supra note 21, at 1527.
60
Id.
61
See, e.g., Dwyer v. State, 357 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2015); Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1144
(Colo. 2013); Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 793–94 (R.I. 2014); Morath v. Texas
Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 850–54 (Tex. 2016).
62
See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy
Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 83,
89–95 (2010) (surveying outcomes in school finance litigation).
63
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 948–50 (Cal. 1976), supplemented, 569 P.2d 1303
(Cal. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
64
See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995)
(determining whether “State’s public school financing system effectively fails to provide for a
minimally adequate educational opportunity”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
200 (Ky. 1989) (“The subject matter of this lawsuit is whether the General Assembly has complied with
its constitutional duty to provide an ‘efficient’ system of common schools in Kentucky.”). North
Carolina, interestingly, blends the fundamental rights analysis with the duty analysis, finding that
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Article, the important point is that, regardless of the theory, these courts
have held that students can enforce education clauses in state constitutions
against the state. Even when courts have refused to enforce a state’s
education clause, the courts have not gone so far as to suggest the
education clause is irrelevant to the delivery of educational opportunity or
that the state is free to disregard it.65 Rather, these courts have reasoned that
while the state constitution may obligate the state to deliver certain
educational opportunities, the specific language in an education clause or
the state’s system of separation of powers affords the state legislature broad
discretion in carrying out its education duty.66 On this basis, these courts
find that they lack the authority to second-guess the legislature.67 In short,
all state constitutions establish education duties and rights. The difference
between states is the extent to which courts have been willing to enforce
those duties and rights to prevent deprivations of educational opportunity.
Most have been willing to do so.
2. Ensuring Equal and Adequate Education.—Depending on the
particular state, the precise right at stake in school finance cases is the right
to equal or adequate educational opportunities.68 Money often takes center
stage only because it substantially affects educational opportunity in
general and those critical inputs that make educational opportunity
meaningful. While money is highly relevant in accessing educational
opportunities, it is not singularly determinative of whether the state has
provided an adequate or equal education. Courts often spend just as much,
if not more, time addressing substantive issues relating to the effect of
teachers, facilities, transportation, and class sizes on educational
opportunity.69 In each of these areas, the general inquiry is whether the state
policies and practices provide students with learning opportunities and
students have a fundamental right to sound basic education. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d
365, 373 (N.C. 2004).
65
Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J., concurring);
Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002).
66
See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017–18 (Colo. 1982) (en banc);
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164 (Ga. 1981); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d
1178, 1185, 1189 (Ill. 1996).
67
See generally Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 714–
15 (2010) (discussing judicial outcomes and finding that one-third dismiss school finance cases based
on separation of powers concerns).
68
Compare Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215 (focusing on adequacy), with Serrano, 557 P.2d at 957–58
(focusing on whether student subgroups had been treated equally).
69
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 169–73 (S.C. 2014) (examining
transportation, teachers, and district size); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II),
801 N.E.2d 326, 333–36 (N.Y. 2003) (evaluating teachers, facilities, and the instrumentalities of
learning).
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resources that are likely or reasonably calculated to produce educational
success for students, which is typically measured through proficiency
levels on end-of-grade standardized tests, graduation rates, and
preparedness for higher education, employment, and the responsibilities of
citizenship.70 In short, the precise legal challenge in most cases is based on
the theory that the state must ensure that existing educational inputs and
opportunities are sufficient to produce academic success.
3.

States Must Meet the Unique Needs of Disadvantaged Students
and Districts.—In general, the state’s obligation is to ensure all
students have the opportunity to succeed in school.71 However, students
from various demographic groups—including but not limited to lowincome students, English Language Learners, students with disabilities, and
racial minorities—often face unique challenges or barriers to academic
achievement.72 Courts have held that states have a duty to implement
policies and provide the resources necessary to address those challenges.73
As the court in Abbott v. Burke74 wrote, “If the claim is that these students
simply cannot make it, the constitutional answer is, give them a chance.”75
Even if the state cannot eliminate students’ challenges, “students are
constitutionally entitled to that help,” and “in some cases for disadvantaged
students to receive a thorough and efficient education, the students will
require above-average access to education resources.”76
A state’s education system and its particular policies may be very
effective in serving the needs of some students and districts, but ineffective
70

See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 381 (N.C. 2004) (stating that,
consistent with the court’s early opinion, plaintiffs presented evidence of “(1) comparative standardized
test score data; [and] (2) student graduation rates, employment potential, post-secondary education
success (and/or lack thereof)”); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294–95 (N.J. 1973), aff’d as
modified on reargument, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973), and on reh’g, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (stating that
the education clause’s “purpose was to impose on the legislature a duty of providing for a thorough and
efficient system of free schools, capable of affording to every child such instruction as is necessary to
fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d
475, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (examining student test scores and graduation rates).
71
See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 337 (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 517)
(stating that a sound basic education “must still ‘be placed within reach of all students,’ including those
who ‘present with socioeconomic deficits’”).
72
Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 389 n.16 (defining the at-risk students whom the state was
obligated to assist).
73
Id. at 390–91 (indicating state had failed to identify and support at-risk students); Abbeville Cty.
Sch. Dist., 767 S.E.2d at 179 (emphasizing the need to address “school districts filled with students of
the most disadvantaged socioeconomic background, exposing students in those school districts to
substandard educational inputs” and rejecting the state’s argument “that nothing can be done to improve
those school districts’ unacceptable performances”).
74
Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
75
Id. at 403.
76
Id. at 402 (quoting Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376, 388 (N.J. 1985)).
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in serving others. For instance, a financing system that relies heavily on
local property tax will generate more than sufficient funds to deliver a
quality education in most metropolitan suburbs, but will be insufficient in
rural areas or impoverished inner-city neighborhoods.77 Likewise, a state
standard that requires that students develop the ability to read short books
independently by the end of the first grade might be reasonable for a
substantial portion of students, but is highly unlikely for a substantial
portion of disadvantaged students unless the education system intervenes
with additional supports for those students.78 Moreover, the gap in learning
outcomes between disadvantaged students and others will only expand over
time in the absence of early and continued supports.79
Based on evidence of this sort, courts have forced states to intervene
in particular districts and on behalf of particular student groups, reasoning
that these students’ ability to obtain equal or adequate education
opportunities rests on these interventions. In other words, states have an
obligation to ensure that their education policies and practices—even if
good in theory or effective for most students—work for those students who
are most in need. Addressing the needs of these students has been the
driving inquiry of most all school finance litigation.
4.

Any Policies that Interfere with the Delivery of Equal and
Adequate Education Are Subject to Challenges.—Because the
right at stake in these cases is an adequate or equal education, not adequate
or equal money, the right is sufficiently flexible to encompass any number
of educational policies that affect educational opportunity.80 Not only has
the litigation encompassed those obvious things like teachers and buildings
that money can buy, it has encompassed things that money cannot buy. For
instance, plaintiffs in Sheff v. O’Neill81 successfully demonstrated that
school district boundaries caused segregation and that segregation was a
77

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (comparing funding
available in Alamo Heights to Edgewood); see generally Bruce J. Biddle & David C. Berliner, Unequal
School Funding in the United States, 59 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 48 (2002) (providing an overview of
traditional school funding practices and the inequalities they produce).
78
See generally Farah Z. Ahmad & Katie Hamm, The School-Readiness Gap and Preschool
Benefits for Children of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2013/11/12/79252/the-school-readiness-gapand-preschool-benefits-for-children-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/LZH6-2BJN] (discussing the school
readiness gap between certain demographic groups and their different language and reading levels).
79
See generally Roland G. Fryer & Steven D. Levitt, Falling Behind: As Children Move Through
School, the Black-White Achievement Gap Expands, 4 EDUC. NEXT 64 (2004).
80
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308–10 (1999); Derek W. Black,
Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 373, 390–403 (2012) (discussing the potential breadth of constitutional rights to education).
81
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
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cause of educational inequality in the state.82 Thus, the court held that
rigidly segregated school districts deprived students of their right to equal
education opportunity.83
More recently, litigants in other states have used theories of adequacy
and equity to challenge teacher and charter school policies. A trial court in
California held that teacher tenure and seniority that keep grossly
ineffective teachers in the classroom deprive students of their fundamental
right to education under the California Constitution.84 Litigants in
Massachusetts have employed a similar strategy in challenging the state’s
cap on the number of charters.85 They argue that the cap deprives students
of a constitutionally sufficient education because it prevents them from
exiting their constitutionally deficient traditional public schools for better
charter schools.86 While the courts have yet to rule there, the claim has
helped generate legislative discussion regarding lifting the cap.87
Regardless of the final resolution of these newer cases, they
demonstrate the breadth of circumstances to which the constitutional right
to an equal or adequate education might apply. Any state policy
substantially impairing educational opportunity is potentially subject to
constitutional challenge. Plaintiffs’ primary hurdle is not at the theoretical
level of whether constitutional rights to education limit some particular
type of education policy regarding teachers, financing, segregation, or
discipline, but in making the factual showing that the policy or practice in
question—whatever it might be—is the actual cause of substantial and
systematic injury to students.
5.

82

The Ultimate Responsibility for Educational Opportunities Rests
with the State.—The foregoing principles rest on one final

Id. at 1270–71.
Id. at 1288–89.
84
Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014), rev’d,
202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), as modified, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3,
2016), reh’g denied, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016); Verified Amended Complaint at
¶7, Davids v. State, No. 201415-A-043 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2014); see also Order Denying Motion
to Dismiss, Davids v. State, No. 201415-A-043 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/2015-march-motion-to-dismiss-denied--a-043---davidswright.pdf [https://perma.cc/G66R-22BL] (New York case surviving motion to dismiss).
85
Derek Black, New Lawsuit Claims Cap on Charter Schools Is Unconstitutional, EDUC. L. PROF.
BLOG (Mar. 17, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2015/03/new-lawsuit-claimscap-on-charter-schools-is-unconstitutional-.html [https://perma.cc/GKQ7-NPA7].
86
Id.
87
Nina Rees, Too Much Left to Chance: States with Charter School Caps Should Stop Abandoning
Students to the Whims of a Lottery, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/04/08/massachusetts-should-lift-charter-school-cap
[https://perma.cc/
9PGP-RWRQ] (discussing Massachusetts Governor’s calls to lift the cap).
83

16

111:1 (2016)

Reforming School Discipline

foundational principle: the state is ultimately responsible for the
educational opportunities that students do and do not receive.88 While
variations in educational opportunity and students’ academic achievement
may be random in some respects, the state has the responsibility to monitor
educational opportunity and intervene to address policies and practices that
interfere with students’ ability to receive an equal or quality education.89
On this basis, courts have forced states to correct problems occurring at the
local level.90
For decades, states left local districts to their own devices in funding
and determining the academic rigor in schools.91 When certain districts
produced poor academic outcomes, the state blamed school districts and/or
the students.92 According to the state, school districts were mismanaged or
their students faced too many personal challenges.93 Either way, academic
failure was not the state’s fault. This, moreover, was the price of local
autonomy, which states claimed was an important goal to pursue.94
School finance litigation eliminated these defenses. The responsibility
for academic success and the school funding necessary to deliver it now
falls primarily on the state.95 As the court in Rose explained:
The sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools is that of
our General Assembly. It is a duty—it is a constitutional mandate placed by
the people on the 138 members of that body who represent those selfsame
people.
The General Assembly must not only establish the system, but it must monitor
it on a continuing basis so that it will always be maintained in a constitutional

88

See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he sole
responsibility for providing the system of common schools lies with the General Assembly.” (emphasis
in original)); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Pub. Sch. Fin. Sys.), 765 A.2d 673, 676 (N.H. 2000)
(“The State may not shift any of this constitutional responsibility to local communities. . . .”).
89
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211.
90
Id.
91
Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773,
781 (1992).
92
Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 398 (N.J. 1990) (“The State contends that the education currently
offered in these poorer urban districts is tailored to the students’ present need, that these students simply
cannot now benefit from the kind of vastly superior course offerings found in the richer districts.”);
Abbott I, 495 A.2d 376, 384–86 (N.J. 1985) (blaming local mismanagement); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist.
v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 179 (S.C. 2014) (noting the state’s position that “nothing can be done to
improve those [high poverty] school districts’ unacceptable performances”).
93
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 92.
94
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973).
95
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216; Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408–10 (imposing duty on the state to fund
education, notwithstanding its claims of local mismanagement).
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manner. The General Assembly must carefully supervise it, so that there is no
waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level.96

Thus, more practically, if some local districts lack the funding to
deliver a quality education, the state has the duty to supplement those
districts or come up with a new statewide funding scheme.97 If districts
cannot hire or retain the quality teachers necessary to ensure effective
instruction and learning, the state has the responsibility to take the steps
necessary to improve teacher quality.98 If local districts waste the resources
the state gives them to hire quality teachers and help develop existing ones,
the state has the responsibility to stop this waste.99 In short, states cannot
avoid their constitutional obligation to ensure appropriate educational
opportunities by pointing to the failures of local school leaders or the
extraordinary disadvantages their students face outside school.
C. Implications for School Discipline Reform
In the context of the foregoing principles, suspensions and expulsions
raise constitutional concerns well beyond the basic procedural due process
rules that courts have traditionally applied.100 First, when a student is
removed from school, the student is not just losing access to some statutory
benefit that the state is free to condition or limit. Rather, the student is
losing access to a constitutional right or an opportunity that the state is
constitutionally obligated to deliver. This should trigger heightened
scrutiny, which requires more important and more carefully thought-out
justifications for school exclusions than schools have currently offered.
Second, where discipline policy affects the overall quality of education and
academic outcomes in school,101 the constitutional right to education can

96

Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211.
Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408–10; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d
50, 53 (N.Y. 2006) (evaluating state’s new funding plan after prior finding of liability); DeRolph v.
State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737–40 (Ohio 1997) (detailing various flaws in state’s funding scheme).
98
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist., 767 S.E.2d at 171 (rejecting finding that state had done enough to
ensure access to quality teachers); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 340 (N.Y. 2003) (finding that state’s
funding policies were a causal factor in New York City’s inability to hire quality teachers).
99
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (requiring “careful state and local
supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency”); Rose,
790 S.W.2d at 193 (“An adequate school system must also include careful and comprehensive
supervision at all levels to monitor personnel performance and minimize waste. If and where waste and
mismanagement exist, including but not limited to improper nepotism, favoritism, and misallocation of
school monies, they must be eliminated, through state intervention if necessary.”).
100
See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that due process requires that
schools afford students notice and an opportunity to respond prior to suspension).
101
See infra notes 249–311 and accompanying text.
97
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obligate a state to intervene in and manage the discipline system in a way
that furthers educational quality rather than undermines it.
Third, the disproportionate burden of school discipline on at-risk
students should trigger the state’s obligation to help at-risk students
overcome academic barriers. At-risk students happen to be the ones most
often disciplined in schools.102 Thus, they suffer the most direct negative
academic consequences of suspension and expulsion. The states’ obligation
to both avoid this outcome and assist students in achieving better outcomes
should require the state to take specific action to alter existing discipline
policy and practice. The recognition of this point would further offer an
important counter to the traditional notion that consequences for student
misbehavior rightly falls solely on the misbehaving student.
Finally, the foregoing principles also offer a strong rejoinder to the
notion that the fault in discipline policy lies with misguided exercises of
local discretion. Because schools exercise enormous discretion in making
discipline decisions, states would instinctively respond that variances in the
discipline decisions that occur across schools and districts—whether good
or bad—are not of the state’s making. Thus, the state cannot be held liable.
School finance precedent, however, suggests that local districts are not so
easily separated from the state because the state retains the responsibility to
monitor and direct their activities toward appropriate educational outcomes.
Each of these points is further explored in Parts II and III.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION REQUIRES
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF DISCIPLINE POLICIES
In the late 1990s, a few individual students and their attorneys
happened on the idea that school finance precedent might offer a basis to
limit their exclusion from school. If school finance precedent rendered
education a fundamental or constitutional right, some form of heightened
scrutiny—either intermediate or strict scrutiny—should apply when states
take that education away from students. These discipline cases, however,
were uncoordinated and idiosyncratic. Relatively few cases have been filed
and even fewer decided by a high court. Those few state courts that issued
opinions in these cases afforded the key constitutional issues varying
degrees of attention and reached conflicting results. For purposes of
analysis, the decisions can be grouped into four categories, each of which is
explored in Section II.A. None of these approaches have proven to be a
good model for future litigation. The interplay between discipline policies
102

LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 5, at 8 tbl.1 (showing the high rates of suspension for racial
minorities, students with disabilities, and English Language Learners).
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and the constitutional right to education remains grossly undertheorized
and past litigation strategies seriously flawed. Section II.B details those
flaws. Section II.C then offers a new litigation strategy and framework for
correcting those flaws.
A. Past Responses to Extending School Finance Precedent to Discipline
1. Students Forfeit Their Rights Through Misbehavior.—Two courts
treat the development of the constitutional right to education in school
finance precedent as practically irrelevant to discipline. The supreme courts
of Massachusetts and Wyoming reasoned that the right to education is
subject to a student’s good behavior.103 That is, misbehaving students
forfeit the right to education.104 Massachusetts’s highest court wrote that the
state constitution imposes on the state a “duty to provide children an
adequate public education[, which] includes the duty to provide a safe and
secure environment in which all children can learn.”105 But the court
reasoned that “a student’s interest in a public education can be forfeited by
violating school rules,” or in the instant case, by bringing what the school
termed a weapon to school.106 Thus, the heightened scrutiny that might
otherwise have applied was never triggered.107 Instead, the default rational
basis review applied.108 The Wyoming Supreme Court, in contrast,
recognized that education was a fundamental right that could trigger strict
scrutiny, but similar to Massachusetts emphasized that schools have the
authority to prohibit certain behavior and a student can “temporarily forfeit
educational services through his own conduct.”109 This fact, as much as any
justification the school might offer for exclusion, weighed heavily on the
court’s analysis. “The actual receipt of educational services is accordingly
contingent upon appropriate conduct in conformity with state law and
school rules.”110 In sum, under these courts’ approaches, the existence of a
constitutional or fundamental right to equitable or adequate educational
opportunities does almost nothing to increase the protections afforded to
suspended and expelled students.
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Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868,
874 (Wyo. 2004).
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2.

School Exclusion Infringes a Fundamental Right and Triggers
Strict Scrutiny.—While forfeiture theory may remain as a
motivation to reach a particular doctrinal conclusion, other courts have
focused more on whether school finance precedent creates a right that
would trigger heightened scrutiny.111 They are split on the answer to this
question but share a similarly cursory approach to the analysis. Those
courts that find a right generally assume or infer its existence without any
serious analysis of precedent on the issues. For instance, in Phillip Leon M.
v. Greenbrier County Board of Education,112 the West Virginia Supreme
Court held that strict scrutiny applies to school exclusion, reasoning that
prior school finance precedent indicates education is a fundamental right.113
While prior cases had treated education as a fundamental right, the context
there was quite different. The issue in those prior school finance cases was
about the “discriminatory classification found in the educational financing
system,” which raises class-based discrimination concerns and systemic
statewide injuries.114 The court in Phillip Leon was willing to import the
precedent from school finance without accounting for these distinctions. A
few years later, a New Jersey trial court recognized the importance of the
state constitutional right to education and held that “expulsion of an
adjudicated juvenile by his local school board does not sound the death
knell for his constitutional right to receive alternative education in another
setting.”115 The court did not specifically frame its analysis in terms of strict
scrutiny, but clearly implied the state lacked a justification for entirely
excluding students from education, even those having engaged in the most
serious types of misconduct.116 The most careful examination of the
question may have been by the Wyoming Supreme Court, but as suggested
above, its analysis, in effect, elevated the notion of forfeiture based on
misbehavior above that of forcing the state to justify exclusion.117
111

See, e.g., Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 913 (W. Va. 1996),
holding modified by Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1997) (“[W]hen
a state acts to the disadvantage of some suspect class or to impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly
or implicitly protected by the West Virginia Constitution, strict scrutiny will apply, and the state will
have to prove that its action is necessary because of a compelling government interest.”).
112
484 S.E.2d at 909.
113
Id. at 910 (relying on the basic previous holding in Pauley v. Kelly that education is a
fundamental right).
114
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
115
State ex rel. G.S., 749 A.2d 902, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
116
Id. at 904, 908 (finding that a student who “participat[ed] in [a] bomb threat incident” in a
district with a “history of several such incidents” still has a right to receive alternative education until he
graduates or turns nineteen years old).
117
In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004) (“[T]he fundamental right to an opportunity for an
education does not guarantee that a student cannot temporarily forfeit educational services through his
own conduct.”).
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3.

School Exclusion Does Not Infringe Any Fundamental or
Constitutional Right to Education.—Those courts that reject the
existence of a constitutional right that triggers heightened scrutiny do so on
equally simplistic reasoning. They conclude that past school finance cases
never specifically and explicitly declared such a right—even though those
courts never rejected such a right either. For instance, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts wrote that its prior school funding decision “should
not be construed as holding that the Massachusetts Constitution guarantees
each individual student the fundamental right to an education.”118 The
rejection of a fundamental right in the discipline case was premised on the
notion that the prior school funding case had held that the state had a duty
to afford students an adequate education, not that education is a
fundamental right.119 While this distinction is technically accurate, it
entirely ignores the fact that the school funding plaintiffs had premised the
state’s duty to deliver adequate education on the notion that students had a
constitutional right to education. The Supreme Judicial Court in the funding
case had written
The defendants argue that the placement of the education provision in “The
Frame of Government,” rather than in the “Declaration of Rights,”
undermines the plaintiffs’ argument that they have a constitutional “right” to
education. . . . [T]his argument is unpersuasive; we believe that the placement
of the education provisions in Part II, The Frame of Government, is a forceful
statement that education is both a duty of and a prerequisite for republican
government. And, if “legislatures and magistrates” have a constitutional duty
to educate, then members of the Commonwealth have a correlative
constitutional right to be educated.120

The Nebraska Supreme Court’s treatment of the issues was even more
cursory, dismissing the fundamental right to education as a limitation on
discipline in one short paragraph. It wrote that while “we have construed
the [education clause in the state constitution] as pertinent to the issue of
the constitutionality of school financing,” the court has “not construed this
language in the context of student discipline to mean that a fundamental
right to education exists in this state, and we decline to do so today.”121 It
offered no explanation for rejecting the right other than that no prior court
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Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995).
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McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527 n.23 (Mass. 1993) (citing
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978)).
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Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997).
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had established the right. In the absence of such a right, Nebraska and
Massachusetts would only apply rational basis to school exclusions.122
4.

School Exclusion Implicates Statutory Rights and Triggers
Intermediate Scrutiny.—The final two states to address school
discipline in light of a possible constitutional right to education fall
squarely between the rational basis approach of Massachusetts and
Nebraska and the strict scrutiny approach of West Virginia, New Jersey,
and Wyoming. Mississippi applied a review closely resembling
intermediate scrutiny without explicitly naming it as such, while North
Carolina explicitly adopted intermediate scrutiny.
In Mississippi, no school finance precedent existed to establish
education as a fundamental right, nor did the state constitution have an
education clause suggesting as much.123 But in Clinton Municipal Separate
School District v. Byrd,124 a long-term suspension case, the Mississippi
Supreme Court indicated that “the right to a minimally adequate public
education created and entailed by the laws of this state is one we can only
label fundamental.”125 The court did not, however, apply strict scrutiny in
evaluating the school’s disciplinary policy.
Instead, the court indicated that the question was whether the
punishment “furthers a substantial legitimate interest of the school
district.”126 The standard articulation of intermediate scrutiny is that it
requires an “important” government interest and means that “substantially”
further the important interest, whereas rational basis requires a “legitimate”
state interest and means that are “rationally related” or simply “further” the
legitimate interest.127 The standard offered in Clinton does not squarely fit
in either, but insofar as it includes the idea of substantiality, it would appear
to require a justification in excess of rational basis. Yet, the court’s later
emphasis on deferring to schools sounds in rational basis review:
The authority vested in school boards consistent with this constitutional
limitation includes substantial discretion with respect to the administration of
punishments to students who violate school rules. This Court has heretofore

122

Id.; Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1097.
Thro, supra note 21, at 1661; see also Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d
237, 240 (Miss. 1985) (noting that the obligation to provide education came from statutes).
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477 So. 2d 237.
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Id. at 240.
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Id.
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Id. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 687
(4th ed. 2011) (describing the requirements for each standard of review).
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determined that it will not interfere with school boards in the exercise of such
discretion so long as constitutional parameters are not transgressed.128

Moreover, the court justified its conclusion that the students’
punishment met the standard by pointing to federal cases involving similar
facts, but which had applied rational basis review in the context of
substantive due process challenges.129
A decade later, another Mississippi student challenged a ten-day
suspension and denial of alternative education, which combined to severely
impact his grades and course credit in school.130 The Mississippi Supreme
Court restated its earlier constitutional holding in Clinton,131 but refrained
from deciding the case on constitutional grounds. It reasoned that a state
statute requiring districts to provide alternative education offered a
sufficient ground to rule in the student’s favor.132 The statute applied to all
suspended and expelled students, regardless of the reasons for or length of
suspension.133 Thus, the district’s denial of access to alternative school
during the suspension was prohibited.134
The most recent decision addressing the intersection of discipline and
the constitutional right to education was decided in North Carolina in King
ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education.135 Like
Mississippi, the court decided the case on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds, holding that students have a statutory right to
alternative education.136 Background concerns about the constitutional right
to education heavily influenced the court’s reasoning. The court wrote:
[A] fundamental right to alternative education does not exist under the state
constitution. Nevertheless, insofar as the General Assembly has provided a
statutory right to alternative education, a suspended student excluded from
alternative education has a state constitutional right to know the reason for her
exclusion.137
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Clinton, 477 So. 2d at 240–41 (citing Shows v. Freeman, 230 So. 2d 63, 64 (Miss. 1969)).
Id. at 241.
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In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115–17 (Miss. 1996).
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Id. at 114 (citing Clinton, 477 So. 2d at 240) (“[W]e agree that T.H. has a fundamental right to
an education as guaranteed by Article 3, Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution.”).
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Id. at 116 (discussing Mississippi statutes in effect at the time).
133
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Suspended or expelled students are eligible for the alternate programs where they exist.”).
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Id. at 117.
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This constitutional right to know—rather than simply a statutory right to
alternative education alone—triggered intermediate scrutiny of school
exclusions.
This “constitutional right to know” sounds very similar to the
procedural due process right to notice first articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Goss v. Lopez.138 Goss required schools to apprise students of the
evidence against them and the reason for suspension.139 The court in King,
however, was referencing a much different right. The point in Goss was to
allow students to contest the accuracy of the evidence. The right in King is
to know the reason for exclusion and question, regardless of the evidence,
whether it is a normatively good reason. In other words, even if a student
stole another student’s cookies, stealing cookies may not be a compelling
enough reason to expel a student.
This right to contest the sufficiency of the basis for exclusion was
previously unheard of in state cases. The court in King only recognized
such a unique right to avoid conflict with the state constitution’s guarantee
to every student of “an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in
our public schools” and its prior holdings that equal access to and
participation in education “is a fundamental right.”140 Whereas deprivation
of the fundamental right to education itself may have triggered strict
scrutiny, the court reasoned that the statutory right to alternative education
combined with this new right to know only required intermediate
scrutiny.141
B. Flaws and Limitations in the Litigation
While the foregoing cases differ in the scrutiny applied, they are
similar in their assumptions, flaws, and apparent uncertainty as to how to
best approach the issues. To varying degrees, they all avoided serious
analysis of the fundamental constitutional questions at issue. Rather than
evaluate the existence of a right to education and the state’s justification for
taking it away, they obfuscated the issues by focusing on forfeiture theory,
considering alternative school as a viable option, or addressing the issues
solely in the context of cases involving serious misconduct. In all fairness,
whether state constitutional education clauses create individual rights is a
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419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 581 (requiring that a student “be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present
his side of the story”).
140
King, 704 S.E.2d at 261–62.
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Id. at 263–65.
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complex question,142 and this complexity may help explain why no court
clearly addresses it.143 Nonetheless, the alternative grounds on which the
courts decide the cases adds to their dissonance. The following Sections
analyze each of these problems.
1. Bad Facts Make Bad Law: Choosing the Wrong Cases.—One
explanation for why the legal analysis in prior discipline cases is
underdeveloped is that the facts disincentivized courts from seriously
entertaining plaintiffs’ claims. In effect, the facts of some of the cases
involved sufficiently serious misconduct that the students may have been
unable to reverse their suspension or expulsion under any level of scrutiny.
In each of the cases discussed in Section II.A., the students admitted to
engaging in serious misbehavior that potentially posed a danger to others or
themselves. The offenses included firearm possession, alcohol
consumption, the sale of marijuana, engaging in a multi-person brawl,
possession of a hidden blade in a lipstick case, and possession of a
switchblade knife.144
In the context of serious misbehavior, a court may have relatively little
incentive to parse through the analysis of school finance precedent and
fundamental or constitutional rights recognition, much less declare a new
right. Moreover, even if a court were to apply heightened scrutiny, serious
misbehavior narrows the contested issues in problematic ways. Students
who engage in weapon- or drug-related misbehavior, for instance, are not
in a good position to challenge the state’s authority to remove them from
school. No one seriously challenges the state’s authority to exclude
students with drugs or weapons from regular school. Schools clearly have a
substantial or compelling interest in safety.145 Thus, even under strict
scrutiny, the most a student could do is dispute whether a school’s response
to the misbehavior was narrowly tailored.146 And the best remedy the
student is likely to get is assignment to alternative school.
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See generally Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education,
48 GA. L. REV. 949, 951–53 (2014) (arguing that school finance cases have not created “individual
rights to education”).
143
Id. (arguing that “rights talk” in state constitutional cases is more “rhetoric” than “reality”).
144
King, 704 S.E.2d at 261 (fight involving multiple students); In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 112
(Miss. 1996) (attended school activity having bought and consumed alcohol illegally); In re RM,
102 P.3d 868, 870 (Wyo. 2004) (“selling marijuana to other students while on school grounds”); Phillip
Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 911 (W. Va. 1996) (firearm at school); Doe
v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Mass. 1995) (blade in lipstick case); Kolesnick v.
Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Neb. 1997) (switchblade knife).
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See, e.g., King, 704 S.E.2d at 265; In re RM, 102 P.3d at 873 (“There is little doubt that the
safety and welfare of students in the state are of utmost importance.”).
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See, e.g., In re RM, 102 P.3d at 874; Phillip Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 916.
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These types of facts, nonetheless, have dominated past litigation—
most likely because these students have the most at stake and litigation is
their only option. In most of the above cases, students have been denied
both the right to attend regular school and an alternative. Without judicial
intervention, their public education is entirely over until the next school
term or potentially longer. In contrast, a student who engages in less
serious behavior, such as disrespecting a teacher, is more likely to receive a
suspension ranging from one to ten days, which theoretically does not
prevent the student from normal progress in school, but which still entail
the high burdens of litigation to challenge. Yet, it is these very types of
cases that need to be brought.
2. Better Facts Would Make Better Law.—To reform school
discipline and protect the constitutional right to education, meaningful
litigation must avoid weapon and drug cases and, instead, focus on
everyday discipline and exclusion. Drug and weapon offenses only account
for a very small portion of school exclusions.147 In Indiana, for instance,
they account for only about 5% of all suspensions and expulsions.148 A full
51% of suspensions were for “disruptive behavior” and another 44% fell in
the catchall of “other.”149 In other words, 95% of suspensions in Indiana
involved relatively minor misbehavior.150 It is here, in the predominant
circumstances in which suspension and expulsion occur, where students’
constitutional claims are strongest.
A school that regularly suspended disruptive, disrespectful, and
defiant students (and potentially expelled repeat offenders) would face two
substantial hurdles under heightened review. The school would lack an
obvious substantial or compelling interest in excluding these students.
School safety is a compelling interest,151 but these students do not pose a
serious physical threat to themselves or others, as would students who
brought real weapons or drugs to school. Likewise, a school likely has a
very important or compelling interest in maintaining an orderly learning
environment,152 but an orderly school environment is a far more contextual
147

See, e.g., LOSEN & MARTINEZ, supra note 5, at 20; CONN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5,
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For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a school’s authority to infringe on
students’ free speech when it “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
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concept. A school in which teachers spend most of their time settling
students down and attempting to keep them focused on learning would
probably fall in the category of disorderly, but does the occasional student
outburst or disruption seriously undermine order and learning or is it
simply something to be expected from time to time? Either way, social
science indicates that using suspensions and expulsions as a primary means
of dealing with minor student misbehavior does not work.153 To the
contrary, it often makes matters worse. A school’s gut instinct that
removing disruptive students breeds order and respect might suffice under
permissive rational basis review, but would require far more validation
under heightened scrutiny.
The second hurdle in excluding students for routine misbehavior
would be demonstrating that exclusion is narrowly tailored. A denial of
both regular and alternative education is an overbroad response.154 While
some courts have found that total exclusion is a narrowly tailored response
to serious misbehavior, the same does not follow for disrespectful students.
They do not pose safety threats and, in alternative school, no longer pose a
disruption to the regular school environment.155 Schools that deny these
students alternative education do so simply to avoid the financial cost, but
avoiding costs alone would be insufficient to render exclusion narrowly
tailored.156
But as emphasized above, access to quality alternative schools is a
distraction. With minor misbehavior, any number of more moderate
153

See infra notes 249–76.
Studies consistently show that suspension just makes matters worse for both the punished
student and his peers. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, Are Zero
Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM.
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that when properly implemented, interventions other than referral to the office for discipline work the
overwhelming majority of the time).
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IV), 710 A.2d 450, 532 (N.J. 1998).
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Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1996)
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responses ranging from detention or lost privileges to thoughtful
conversations with counselors or principals are just as—if not more—
effective in protecting the students’ right to education while also
maintaining order.157 These, of course, are just the low-cost ways of dealing
with misbehavior. A large body of research shows that schools and students
would be best served to institute positive behavioral supports or restorative
justice programs.158 These programs remediate misbehavior and often
reduce it in the first instance, whereas punitive discipline tends to
undermine behavioral and academic outcomes.159
In sum, the deference courts might afford schools regarding students
who bring weapons or drugs to school does not exist with routine
misbehaviors that lead to most school exclusions. Litigating serious
misbehaviors, like the focus on alternative schools, has distracted from the
key issues in school discipline and made student victories harder to secure.
Litigation focused on nonserious misbehavior, in contrast, would place the
state at a disadvantage, both in terms of articulating an important or
compelling interest in punishment and in demonstrating that its chosen
punishment is narrowly tailored.
3. Avoiding the Key Constitutional Issues.—Determining whether a
student has a constitutionally protected interest in education involves
complexities that none of the foregoing cases explored. Past cases have
avoided addressing the question. Two courts avoided serious consideration
of the issue by reasoning the students have forfeited any potential education
right.160 Two explicitly avoided the question by deciding the case on
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statutory grounds.161 And two assumed the question required no further
analysis because school finance had resolved it.162
The North Carolina Supreme Court went the furthest in
acknowledging the constitutional interests at stake, but still refused to
directly rule on them. It acknowledged that a constitutional right to
education would trigger strict scrutiny and rejecting the right would
relegate problematic discipline policies to rational basis.163 Believing both
to be bad results, the court sought to strike a middle ground and apply
intermediate scrutiny.164 The problem is that it lacked any clear basis upon
which to do so. Thus, it was compelled to articulate a previously unheard of
“constitutional right to know” the reason for school exclusion.165 This right,
however, did not actually impose a limitation of exclusion itself, but rather
offered the court a justification for applying heightened scrutiny to the loss
of the statutory right in alternative education.166 That the court would take
such an awkward and unusual route toward its result reflects the
significance of the underlying constitutional issues.
To North Carolina and the other courts’ defense, no clearly defined
roadmap to adjudicating individual personal constitutional education claims
exists.167 Even if school finance precedent clearly declared an individual
right, the precedent offers no guidance as to how to apply that individual
161

King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. 2010); In
re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115 (Miss. 1996) (stating that statutory grounds “offer[] this Court an
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Id. at 261 (“In acknowledging a statutory right to alternative education, we stress that a
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right in the context of discipline. Courts deciding discipline cases would
face a number of open questions regarding the level of scrutiny to apply,
the state interests and methods that would suffice under the chosen
scrutiny, and how the right might also alter the due process necessary prior
to exclusion.
Courts are disincentivized from addressing these difficult questions
because a simpler, alternate roadmap is available. If a court decides on
statutory or forfeiture grounds, a host of state and federal decisions dictate
a straightforward analysis in which the only questions are whether the state
has a rational basis for exclusion and whether the student received basic
due process prior to exclusion.168 Thus, when confronted with constitutional
discipline claims in this precedential context, the easiest solution for
reluctant or uncertain courts is to assume that school finance precedent has
not changed anything and that the default procedural due process and
rational basis analysis remains in place. In short, transitioning from the
traditional context in which education is only a statutory right to one in
which education is a constitutional right is fraught with difficulty given the
novelty of the constitutional issues involved.
School finance precedent’s failure to answer key questions regarding
how the doctrines articulated there might apply in other contexts and the
disincentives to answering these questions in discipline cases help explain
the seemingly inapposite and confused results in discipline cases. All of the
courts recognized the constitutional implications of school exclusion, but
none could find definite and satisfying answers in school finance
precedent.169 As a result, they each found a way to skip the issue or
minimize its relevance: Nebraska and Massachusetts by preempting the
question based on forfeiture theory,170 Wyoming and West Virginia by
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or of its application to” a particular student). See also Larry Bartlett & James McCullagh, Exclusion
from the Educational Process in the Public Schools: What Process Is Now Due, 1993 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 1 (1993) (providing an overview of what due process requires in school discipline).
169
See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095–97 (Mass. 1995); Clinton
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240–41 (Miss. 1985); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch.
Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997); King, 704 S.E.2d at 261–62; Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 913–15 (W. Va. 1996); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 872–74 (Wyo.
2004).
170
Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1096; Kolesnick, 558 N.W.2d at 813.
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resting the weight of their analysis on narrow tailoring,171 and Mississippi
and North Carolina by awkwardly splitting the difference through statutory
analysis.172
4.

The Unresolved Tension Between Education Rights and Education
Duties.—The question of whether school finance precedent
creates individual rights is really a question of the nature and scope of those
rights. While school finance cases often refer to constitutional rights or
interests,173 almost none of those cases involved the question of whether
their state constitution’s education clause created an individual personal
right to education. Rather, the cases addressed the state’s general systemic
duty in education and the extent to which it obligates the state to create a
quality or an equal system.174 In other words, school finance cases clearly
impose an education duty on the state, but whether those duties correspond
to an individual personal right is rarely explicitly decided.175
The concept of a duty with no corresponding individual rights is
troubling, but not unprecedented. Tort law, for instance, traditionally treats
police and fire protection as public duties of local government, but those
duties rarely create enforceable individual rights.176 When local government
voluntarily provides a finite service to the public at large, it does not
presumptively obligate itself to meet the needs and interests of each
individual citizen.177 Were courts to recognize such a right, they would
disincentivize government from taking on public duties in the first
instance.178
171

In re RM, 102 P.3d at 876; Phillip Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 914–16, holding modified by Cathe A. v.
Doddridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1997).
172
King, 704 S.E.2d at 264–65; In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 116–17 (Miss. 1996).
173
See Bitner, supra note 20, at 779 (identifying sixteen states as recognizing education as a
fundamental right, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
174
See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993)
(indicating the individual was enforcing a public duty); see generally Bauries, supra note 142, at 986–
89 (finding that education has been enforced primarily as a duty); Sonja Ralston Elder, Enforcing
Public Educational Rights via a Private Right of Action, 1 DUKE F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 143–44
(2009) (revealing that the overwhelming percentage of cases have been brought on behalf of a group of
students or a school district and sought to force the state to carry out its duty to a group of students
rather than the rights or interests of individual students).
175
Bauries, supra note 142, at 952–53 (“[B]oth the evidence presented and the remedies the courts
order focus on the state education system as a whole, rather than on any individual student rightsholders.”).
176
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 333, 723–24 (2000).
177
Id. at 723.
178
Id. at 726–37. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860–61 (N.Y. 1968)
(emphasizing that the amount of protection the City provides is to be dictated by the availability of local
resources, not courts).

32

111:1 (2016)

Reforming School Discipline

Education clauses, however, stand in stark contrast to these other
public service duties. Today’s legislatures and local districts are not
voluntarily providing education or bestowing gratuitous benefits on
individuals. Education is part of the constitutional compact between
citizens and the government.179 The point of that compact is to obligate the
state to provide education regardless of the burden it imposes on the
state.180 Likewise, education clauses are not mere job descriptions or grants
of power, like those granted to Congress and the President in the federal
Constitution.181 In many states, they are specific directives to achieve
particular results for the benefit of citizens.182

179

In fact, this new education compact was for Southern states a condition of readmission to the
Union following the Civil War. See generally ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 90 (2009) (“A central feature of Radical Reconstruction was to require . . . the southern
states to revise their constitutions . . . as a condition of readmission to the Union.” (emphasis in
original)); John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State
Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 26–27 (1998)
(describing various developments in Confederate state constitutions following the Civil War). The
legislatures that passed these new education amendments were heavily populated by former slaves who
wanted to ensure access to education that would help guarantee their place as citizens. See James
Lowell Underwood, African American Founding Fathers, in AT FREEDOM’S DOOR: AFRICAN
AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA 13–15 (James
Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke Jr. eds., 2000). State supreme courts, after reviewing the
legislative history of their education clauses, often emphasize that the clause’s purpose is to equip
students for citizenship and ensure the continuance of democracy and self-government. See, e.g., Conn.
Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 227 (Conn. 2010) (“[T]he state
constitution embodies a substantive component requiring that the public schools provide their students
with an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate
fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and voting, and to prepare them to progress to
institutions of higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the
state’s economy.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993)
(“[T]his duty is designed not only to serve the interests of the children, but, more fundamentally, to
prepare them to participate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a republican
government, namely the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.”); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt.
1997) (“To keep a democracy competitive and thriving, students must be afforded equal access to all
that our educational system has to offer. In the funding of what our Constitution places at the core of a
successful democracy, the children of Vermont are entitled to a reasonably equal share.”).
180
In the South, of course, there was significant opposition to the provision of education,
particularly to African-Americans. The new education clauses broke that resistance. Underwood, supra
note 179, at 14–15; see also INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES:
A DESKBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT EDUCATION (2008)
(detailing the history of each education clause).
181
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . .”); id. art. 2, § 1 (“[The
president shall] faithfully execute the Office [and] preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. . . .”).
182
See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII (stating that the purpose of education clause is
“preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education
through the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty
of the [state] . . . [to] promot[e] . . . agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and
natural history of the country”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 395–96 (Tex.
1989) (“Other delegates recognized the importance of a diffusion of knowledge among the masses not
only for the preservation of democracy, but for the prevention of crime and for the growth of the
economy.”).
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Regardless, school discipline cases do not even acknowledge these
underlying issues. Some simply assume a constitutional right to education
exists while others conclude it does not exist for the purposes of school
exclusion simply because school finance precedent does not explicitly
declare such a right.183 The latter assumption is incorrect. At worst, school
finance precedent, on the whole, neither affirms nor rejects an individual
constitutional right.184 In other words, the question of whether students have
an individual personal right to education may be an open question in
precedent, but it is not foreclosed.
The discipline cases skip over the duty–rights distinction and the
questions involved in finding an individual personal right in education by
pointing to school finance opinions that speak of a “fundamental” right or
interest in education or a “constitutional right” to an adequate education.185
For the purpose of individual personal rights creation, however, these
phrases are mere tautology. If the phrasing matters at all, it is only relevant
to the type of scrutiny a court might presumptively apply.186 But all of these
courts apply some level of aggressive or heightened review and are
functionally equivalent in the remedies they impose, all of which are aimed
at the system of education, not individual rights. For that matter, a number
of courts do not speak of rights at all, but only of states’ constitutional
duties in education. Yet, beyond that phraseology, the cases are practically
indistinguishable.187
To be clear, these references to rights and constitutional duties are
highly suggestive of an individual personal right to education. But they are
not definitive because the issue of individual personal rights was never
183

See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995).
See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 937 (2016)
(questioning the conclusion that a right to education does not exist simply because it has not been
enforced by an injunctive remedy).
185
See, e.g., Bitner, supra note 20, at 778 (focusing on whether states had declared education a
fundamental right).
186
Fundamental rights presumptively trigger strict scrutiny. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 691.
With the constitutional right to education, some courts apply strict scrutiny, while others apply some
unnamed form of rigorous scrutiny. These latter courts appear to apply automatic liability as to the
violation and deference as to remedy. See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003) (holding the
state strictly accountable for deprivation of sound basic education); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v.
Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002), mandate recalled by 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004) (“[W]e
conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional duty to
educate our children . . . .”); CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2006) (deferring on funding remedy).
For purposes of rights creation, however, it does not matter whether the right is fundamental or
constitutional or, for that matter, not labeled a right at all. What matters is whether a court enforced the
education clause as though a right exists.
187
See generally Weishart, supra note 184 (finding that, regardless of whether the underlying legal
theory was based on a duty or a right, the evidence establishing liability and the remedies enforced in
school finance litigation tend to be the same across cases).
184
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squarely before the courts.188 The central issue in school finance litigation,
whether articulated in terms of duties or rights, was the enforceability of
the state’s obligation to establish and support an equal or quality education
system.189 Thus, pronouncements about rights in school finance cases
occurred within a framework primarily focused on the state’s duty to the
public, not to individuals.
School finance courts come closest to meaningfully discussing
individual rights when determining whether an individual can enforce the
state’s education duties against the state.190 This issue, however, is more
akin to a standing question than an individual rights question. In other
words, because school finance cases do not turn on the existence of
individual personal rights, almost no school finance precedent bothers to
distinguish between state duties and individual personal rights. For that
reason, the very few courts that afford the question of individual personal
rights any significance offer only oblique insights.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for instance, specifically
emphasized that “[t]he right to an adequate education mandated by the
constitution is not based on the exclusive needs of a particular individual,
but rather is a right held by the public to enforce the State’s duty.”191 The
court followed with the arguably contradictory statement that “[a]ny citizen
has standing to enforce this right.”192 The Arkansas Supreme Court took a
different tact, indicating that a state “constitution’s specific charge to [the]
legislature to provide education is sufficient to afford fundamental-right
status to beneficiaries of that duty,”193 but that it would refrain from
deciding the issue to avoid triggering strict scrutiny.194 Instead, it simply
held that the constitution “imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional

188

Weishart persuasively argues that past school finance cases are best measured by their
functional holdings rather than their precise rights terminology. Id. at 921. Under a functional approach,
a much larger number of education clauses may create rights. See id. at 922. Under this reasoning, the
discipline decision in Doe v. Superintendent of School, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995), for
instance, would have incorrectly inferred the absence of a right because the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts had previously enforced a state duty to provide a sufficient education in McDuffy v.
Secretary of Executive Office of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993).
189
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 204 (Ky. 1989); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 257 (N.C. 1997).
190
Bauries, supra note 142, at 978–79 (“[T]he ‘right to education’ in these states seems to be
nothing more than the standing of an individual to assert a generalized grievance concerning the
systemic adequacy of the state education system.”).
191
Claremont I, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
192
Id. (citing Fogg v. Bd. of Educ., 82 A. 173 (N.H. 1912)).
193
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 493 (Ark. 2002), mandate recalled
by 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004) (citing Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997)).
194
Id. at 495.
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duty to educate our children.”195 In short, Arkansas and New Hampshire’s
individual rights analyses were indefinite because they were not central to
the issues before the courts. On the issues actually before the courts, they
were clear: their states have an education duty that is privately
enforceable.196
The Washington Supreme Court offered the most direct discussion of
whether there is an individual personal right that bears relevance beyond
structural duties. In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,197 the court
compared the right to education to the rights found in a bill of rights.198 It
would be “illogical [to conclude] that a mandatory constitutional provision
placing an affirmative ‘paramount duty’ on the State to ‘make ample
provision for the education’ of a specific class of citizens is not judicially
enforceable,” while the constitution’s other affirmatively stated rights are
judicially enforceable.199 Thus, like other rights enumerated in the
constitution, the court concluded that education is a “constitutional
guarantee[] of a personal nature.”200 Yet, one could still query whether
Seattle School District conclusively resolved the question of individual
personal rights because, like other cases, it only involved the enforcement
of the state’s systemic education duty.201 In this respect, the difference
between the precise holdings in Washington and other states is minimal at
best, notwithstanding the seemingly positive language in Seattle School
District and the seemingly negative language in cases like New
Hampshire’s.202
In short, school finance precedent, on the whole, does not ascribe
significance to the question of duties versus individual personal rights. In
those few instances when a court seems to raise the issue, the resulting
analysis does not directly answer the questions most pertinent to discipline.
The fairest reading of school finance precedent may simply be that the
scope of any individual right to education is not clearly defined, while state
195

Id.
Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376 (“We hold that part II, article 83 imposes a duty on the State to
provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child.”); Lake View, 91 S.W.3d at 495
(“[W]e conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute constitutional
duty to educate our children . . . .”).
197
585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
198
Id. at 86–87.
199
Id. (citation omitted).
200
Id. at 87.
201
Id. at 84–87 (framing the issue as whether the education clause “is a mere preamble, or policy
declaration, which imposes no judicially enforceable affirmative duty upon either the legislative or
executive branches of government”).
202
See generally Weishart, supra note 184 (arguing that the education enforcement function is
most important).
196
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duties are. To the extent a court insists that an important distinction
between duties and rights matter in discipline, the court must resolve the
question itself, looking to precedent for guidance but not answers. In
looking to those past courts for guidance, the most important thing is what
those courts have done, not the tautology of what they have said.203 What
they have done is apply their state constitutional clauses in ways that force
the state to provide improved educational opportunity for students.204
5. Students Do Not Forfeit Their Rights.—Two courts explicitly
rejected students’ discipline claims on the premise that the students had
forfeited any right to education they might have.205 Two others referenced
forfeiture as a basis for lowering the scrutiny in discipline or sanctioning a
temporary withdrawal of education services.206 Another left open the
possibility of forfeiture.207 These statements and holdings are based on little
more than intuition and rhetoric. Doctrine and logic do not support the
conclusions.
As a general principle, individuals retain their constitutional rights,
notwithstanding their conduct. Incarcerated criminals, for instance, retain
their rights so long as they are not inconsistent with the conditions of their
confinement.208 The U.S. Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that a
criminal defendant does not give up the right to confront witnesses against

203

Id. at 961.
See generally Rebell, supra note 21, at 1468, 1470 (cataloguing the judicial outcomes in favor
of requiring the state to improve educational opportunities and resources for students); Weishart, supra
note 184, at 936.
205
Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub.
Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 814–15 (Neb. 1997).
206
King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 263 (N.C. 2010)
(writing “Leandro does not immunize students from the consequences of their own misconduct” and a
state may “temporarily remov[e] students who engage in misconduct that disrupts the sound basic
education of their peers”); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874–75 (Wyo. 2004) (“[T]he fundamental right to
an opportunity for an education does not guarantee that a student cannot temporarily forfeit educational
services through his own conduct. Educational services are provided with reasonable conditions
because the Wyoming constitution requires that all students receive an equal opportunity to a quality
education.”).
207
Compare Keith D. v. Ball, 350 S.E.2d 720, 722–23 (W. Va. 1986) (“The students in this case
have temporarily forfeited their right to education.”), with Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914 (W. Va. 1996) (applying strict scrutiny, but indicating it was modifying
Keith only to the extent Keith’s holding was inconsistent with the court’s new opinion).
208
See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (“[P]risons are not beyond the reach of
the Constitution. . . . Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be accorded those rights not fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.”); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (stating prisoners “retain[] those First Amendment rights that are
not inconsistent with” prison). Interestingly, states do strip many felons of the right to vote, which the
Court thus far has sanctioned. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). The Fourteenth
Amendment, however, includes a specific textual basis for this holding. Id. at 41–42.
204
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him, even when he has acted violently toward those witnesses.209 In
addition, while the Constitution does not impose any general duty on the
state to protect or provide for the welfare of citizens, during confinement,
the state becomes obligated to feed, clothe, house, and protect prisoners
from certain harms.210
The notion that criminals firmly retain their rights but misbehaving
students do not is difficult to justify. Moreover, federal courts have
specifically indicated that misbehaving students are in no way equivalent to
criminals and retain their federal constitutional rights.211 Thus, the idea in
discipline cases that students forfeit state constitutional rights may have
some rhetorical appeal, but the idea lacks any grounding in logic or law.212
Some courts have therefore simply inappropriately resorted to this
forfeiture theory as a means to avoid the key question of whether students
have an individually enforceable right to education.
6. The Irrelevance of Alternative Schools.—Nearly all the discipline
cases relying on school finance precedent thus far have been challenges to
the failure to provide alternative education.213 Litigating the constitutional
right to education through alternative schools is fundamentally problematic
for doctrinal and practical reasons. In terms of doctrine, litigating access to
alternative school ignores the central question of importance: schools’
authority to exclude students in general. Exclusion from school altogether
unquestionably triggers procedural due process, which under the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Goss v. Lopez requires that students receive
notice of the evidence against them and a chance to respond. Given that
Goss was decided based on an underlying statutory right, additional
procedural protections might be required when the underlying right at stake
is a constitutional right to education. But the focus on alternative schools
alters the issues. Litigants, in effect, concede that districts can remove
209

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (no forfeiture so long as defendant’s intent was
not to deprive the court of access to witnesses).
210
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977)).
211
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968) (holding that public schools cannot be “enclaves of
totalitarianism”).
212
See Bitner, supra note 20, at 794–95 (“School districts’ conceptualization of student
misbehavior as forfeiture is misleading, however. Due to the unique characteristics that children
possess, students are not capable of intentionally relinquishing their rights under an implied consent or
social contract theory.”).
213
See Amy P. Meek, School Discipline “As Part of the Teaching Process”: Alternative and
Compensatory Education Required by the State’s Interest in Keeping Children in School, 28 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 155, 180 (2009) (discussing the challenges seeking access to alternative education).
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students from regular school and seek only to gain access to education
through an alternative school. Likewise, when a court orders a district to
provide alternative education, the court creates its own basis for avoiding
the central constitutional issues.214
First, schools can argue that due process is not triggered when
students have access to alternative school, asserting that expulsion is
actually only a transfer.215 Second, by framing the issue as access to
alternative education, courts moot the constitutional question of the state’s
authority to deprive students of education. When courts require the state to
provide education—albeit alternative education—they create the basis for
the state to argue that students have not actually been deprived of the right
to education. To show a deprivation of education, plaintiffs would need to
show that the alternative school is qualitatively inferior to regular schools
or that the alternative school falls below the constitutional threshold for an
adequate or equal education.216 This showing, if equivalent to that in school
finance litigation, would place an impracticable burden of proof on
individual students.217
214

See, e.g., In re T.H., III, 681 So. 2d 110, 115–17 (Miss. 1996) (“[Alternative school] legislation
offers this Court an attractive alternative to avoid delving into school discipline cases on a constitutional
level.”); King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. 2010)
(“In acknowledging a statutory right to alternative education, we stress that a fundamental right to
alternative education does not exist under the state constitution.”) (applying intermediate scrutiny).
215
See, e.g., Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997)
(reasoning due process did not apply because student “was only to be transferred from one school
program to another program with stricter discipline”); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1359
(6th Cir. 1996) (indicating due process is not triggered “absent some showing that the education
received at the alternative school is significantly different from or inferior to that received at his regular
public school” (first citing C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 389 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996); and then citing Doe
v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 576 (10th Cir. 1994))); Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cty. High Sch. of the
Arts, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding student removed from charter school not
entitled to due process because he could seek enrollment in a regular school). To be clear, however,
these courts’ reasoning is flawed. The reputational injury of assignment to alternative school alone
should be sufficient to trigger due process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975). But see Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (restricting reputation-based due process claims and reasoning that
Goss was premised on the intersection of liberty and property). Moreover, even without a showing of
inferiority, students’ education property rights are sufficiently infringed to trigger constitutional
protection. See Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury
Based on Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903 (2011).
216
This issue has come up most often with procedural due process, where courts have required
some qualitative showing prior to entertaining a due process claim. See, e.g., Buchanan, 99 F.3d at
1359; Doe v. Todd Cty. Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 5069367, at *5 (D.S.D. Nov. 24, 2008); Chyma v. Tama
Cty. Sch. Bd., 2008 WL 4552942, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 8, 2008) (“It appears to be the consensus of the
circuits, however, that placement in an alternative school does not implicate procedural due process
rights unless there is a showing that the education provided by the alternative school is substantially
inferior.”). But see Carroll, supra note 215, at 913–14 (reasoning that this negative due process decision
is not the consensus).
217
See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (N.C. 1997) (“Only such a clear showing [that
students have not received an adequate education] will justify a judicial intrusion into an area so clearly
the province, initially at least, of the legislative and executive branches. . . .”).
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In addition to these doctrinal problems, focusing on access to
alternative schools is also problematic as a practical matter. While highquality alternative schools may be a viable option for some subset of at-risk
students,218 they are not general educational tools. First, they are not
designed for the regular student who is otherwise succeeding in school but
has been suspended or expelled for minor misbehavior.219 These students
lose the academic rigor of regular school and may gain nothing from the
unique services of alternative school. Second, it is far from clear that
alternative schools even work for the students who might actually need
them. The most obvious problem is that many offer the lowest quality
education imaginable; they are more akin to warehouses than locations of
learning.220
Under such circumstances, litigants are fighting a battle that may not
be worth fighting. What students really need is the right to remain in
regular school. Focusing on the right to remain in regular school could
force the state to offer a sufficient interest to exclude students. The cases,
however, do not pose that challenge and are thereby reduced to fighting for
a poor substitute to the constitutional right to education. Moreover, the
existence of that substitute has become the basis by which to moot the key
constitutional issues.

218

Abbott IV, 710 A.2d 450, 532 (N.J. 1998) (explaining how they can offer personalized
education for at-risk students who need it).
219
Id. (describing the model alternative school as one for students with “learning, behavior, and
family problems and need [for] a supportive learning environment”).
220
Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1996) (“[T]he
lack of resources is a major problem for some alternative education . . . .”); C.A. Lehr & C.M. Lange,
Alternative Schools and the Students They Serve: Perceptions of State Directors of Special Education,
14 POL’Y RES. BRIEF, Jan. 2003, at 6 tbl.2, https://ici.umn.edu/products/prb/141/
[https://perma.cc/9V26-ECBU] (identifying insufficient “funds to provide for quality facilities and
instructional resources,” budget cuts, staffing certification, and accountability as issues in alternative
schools); BRIAN KLEINER ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE
SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS FOR STUDENTS AT RISK OF EDUCATION FAILURE: 2000-01, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS REPORT iv (2002) (finding that one-third of the districts had alternative schools that were at
capacity and could not accept more students and finding that more than half had been in that situation in
last three years); CHERYL M. LANGE & SANDRA J. SLETTEN, ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION: A BRIEF
HISTORY AND RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 17–18 (2002) (summarizing several studies finding negative
educational outcomes in alternative schools and indicating that the evidence on improved outcomes is
mixed at best); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO
JAILHOUSE TRACK 36 (2005) (describing Chicago’s alternative schools as warehouses for the students
the district hopes will drop out); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 14 (2000),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-discipline/opportunities-suspendedthe-devastating-consequences-of-zero-tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/crp-opportunitiessuspended-zero-tolerance-2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/534A-84PP] (describing schools with a heavy
police presence that lump grade levels together, run a shorter school day, and fail to provide
instruction).
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C. Framing an Individual Personal Right to Education
that Limits School Exclusion
Courts and litigants must avoid the distractions of alternative school,
notions of forfeiture, and extreme outliers in student behavior. They should
focus on everyday minor misbehavior and whether schools can remove
students for that minor misbehavior. The answer to that question rests first
and foremost on whether students have an individual right to education
grounded in the state constitution. If so, the state will struggle to justify
harsh disciplinary approaches to these students because they do not pose
serious risks to safety or the learning environment and other strategies other
than exclusion are readily available for dealing with these students. If
students do not have an individual state constitutional right to education,
the state can largely discipline students as it sees fit (save those arguments
articulated in Part III).
Whether students have a constitutionally-based right to education that
limits school discipline could be framed in one of two ways. The first
would ask whether students have a constitutional right or interest in
education that school exclusion infringes. The other would ask whether any
such education interest is a personal right or just the benefit that flows from
the state carrying out its constitutional duties in education. The first
framing is the simplest and easily points to recognizing a right to education.
All state constitutions include an affirmative duty to provide
education.221 If negative constitutional rights are enforceable as individual
rights (i.e., to be free of unreasonable searches),222 the conclusion that an
affirmative constitutional duty does not create an individual right is
tenuous. An individual right is the logical corollary of an enforceable
constitutional duty,223 even if a right is not explicitly stated. Consistent with
that notion, most courts appear to assume or imply an individual right to
education in school finance cases.224 Others specifically use the language of
221

See supra note 21.
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985).
223
See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 247–48 (Wash. 2012) (“Flowing from this
constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ is its jural correlative, a correspondent ‘right’ permitting control of
another’s conduct. Therefore, all children residing within the borders of the State possess a ‘right,’
arising from the constitutionally imposed ‘duty’ of the State, to have the State make ample provision for
their education.” (citations omitted)).
224
See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (never declaring a
right, but holding that the “education clause requires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity
for each child to receive a minimally adequate education”); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003)
(indicating the court’s task of enforcing the constitution “began with Levittown’s articulation of the
constitutional right to a sound basic education—not at all a ‘catchphrase for an inferred constitutional
guarantee,’ but this Court’s careful judgment 21 years ago as to what is meant by our State
Constitution’s promise in the Education Article”).
222
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fundamental rights, even if creating discipline rights was not their intent.225
Sixteen states in total specifically declare education a fundamental right or
interest in school finance cases.226 Another large group of states reference a
constitutional duty to deliver education, which again should logically
dictate a right.227 While these constitutional and judicial references and
assumptions may not definitively create an individual constitutional right,
they at the very least create a strong presumption that a right exists. To
conclude a right does not exist, a state should be required to offer a specific
and powerful rationale that, thus far, is entirely missing. After all, it is the
state that is asking that it be exempted from providing education to certain
students.
The second framing—personal right versus public duty—is arguably
subterfuge to disengage from enforcing education clauses. As noted in
Section II.B.2, a duty–rights distinction is a relatively unique concept.
While it may make sense in some contexts, its fit is strained in education,
particularly in the withdrawal of education. First, the affirmative education
obligations in state constitutions and the refusal to carry out that duty in
regard to some students is entirely distinct from the voluntary provision of
other government services.228 Second, while many school finance cases
225

See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,
374 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Robinson v.
Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1975); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255–56 (N.C. 1997);
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d
384, 391–95 (Vt. 1997); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist.
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
226
Bitner, supra note 20, at 766 (citing Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973);
Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244; Horton, 376 A.2d at 374; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 206; Skeen v. State,
505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240
(Miss. 1985); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.H. 1997); Robinson, 351 A.2d at 720;
Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255–56; Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 256; Sch. Dist. of
Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995); Scott v. Commonwealth,
443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Brigham, 692 A.2d at 391–95; Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 346 (W. Va. 1997); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989);
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d at 333.
227
See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 526 (Mass. 1993)
(explaining the “duty to ‘cherish’ public schools as a duty to ensure that the public schools achieve their
object and educate the people”); Claremont I, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993) (writing that the “terms
‘shall be the duty . . . to cherish’ in our constitution . . . command[], in no uncertain terms, that the State
provide an education to all its citizens and that it support all public schools”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist.,
515 S.E.2d at 541 (“[T]he constitutional duty to ensure the provision of a minimally adequate education
to each student in South Carolina rests on the legislative branch of government.”). It is worth
recognizing that scholars disagree as to whether such a duty creates rights. Compare Scott R. Bauries,
The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 718–40 (2012) (questiong whether an education
duty creates rights), with Weishart, supra note 184, at 920 (disagreeing with Bauries).
228
See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of
Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 (2010) (analyzing positive
and negative constitutional guarantees and how state courts should interpret and apply education
clauses). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that while education may not be a
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have analyzed the state’s “education duty” without referencing rights, the
point has not been to contrast a duty to a right. Rather, the point has been to
determine whether the state has an education duty at all and whether courts
can qualitatively assess the manner in which the state discharges that
duty.229 Courts may have disagreed on their capacity to enforce or secondguess this duty, but no serious disagreement exists as to whether the state
has a duty. The explicit language in education clauses clearly indicate they
have a duty and, if they refused to discharge this duty completely, one
could reasonably predict that even more courts would second-guess the
state at that point.230
Third, the claim in discipline cases is not that the state is somehow
doing a poor job of providing education to suspended and expelled
students. Rather, the claim is that a state cannot take education away
without a good reason and, even when it has a good reason, the state must
be careful.231 Plaintiffs are not asking courts to second-guess how the state
carries out its duty. Instead, plaintiffs would be challenging the state’s
refusal to carry out its duty by excluding students under unnecessary
circumstances.232 The contrary notion that the state only has a duty to
educate those students whom it wants to educate is a hard one to fathom.
In sum, precedent, logic, and constitutional clauses all point to the
conclusion that students have an individual right to education. Where
courts have glossed over a specific individual personal right in education, it
may simply be because there is no reason to doubt that such a right exists.
Those courts focusing on education duties have done so primarily as a
strategy for removing themselves from the separation of powers struggles
fundamental right under the federal Constitution, neither is it “merely some governmental ‘benefit’
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”).
229
See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 2002)
(“[B]ecause we conclude that the clear language of Article 14 imposes upon the State an absolute
constitutional duty to educate our children, we conclude that it is unnecessary to reach the issue of
whether a fundamental right is also implied.”).
230
Even the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
indicated that a different question would have been presented had plaintiffs demonstrated that the state
was failing to provide the most minimal level of education. 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (conceding that
“some identifiable quantum of education is . . . constitutionally protected”). See also Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (“[T]his Court has not yet definitively settled . . . whether a minimally
adequate education is a fundamental right.”).
231
See, e.g., King ex. rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 265 (N.C.
2010) (“We believe considerations of fairness, institutional transparency, and public trust are generally
best effectuated when government provides a reason for its denial of services.”); Phillip Leon M. v.
Greenbrier Cty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 914–16 (W. Va. 1996).
232
See, e.g., Phillip Leon, 484 S.E.2d at 912 (explaining that because the Board of Education “did
not have a duty to provide an education to an expelled student . . . and . . . that by his acts, a pupil can
forfeit all rights to a state provided education, the heart of our opinion centers on the right of a
misbehaving pupil to an education in West Virginia”).
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involved in educational finances and quality,233 not to negate an individual
interest or right in education. Given the different context, a duty–right
distinction need not necessarily arise in discipline. The difficult question in
discipline should not be whether a constitutional right exists, but whether
the state has a sufficient justification and narrowly tailored method for
withdrawing that right from students who do not pose a serious threat to
safety or order. As demonstrated in Section II.B.2, the state lacks any clear,
important, or compelling interest in excluding students for minor
misbehavior. Even if it does, far less intrusive means are available to
achieve the state’s interests, which narrowly tailoring would require.
D. Countering Likely Objections
The most likely objection to the foregoing individual rights claim
would be that short-term suspensions, in and of themselves, do not amount
to a deprivation substantial enough to trigger anything more than rational
basis scrutiny. This objection might concede that an expulsion and denial
of education services during expulsion might trigger strict scrutiny, but a
short-term suspension only involves a temporary exclusion from school
that can amount to less than one percent of the school year. As such, a
suspension does not per se prevent a student from making regular academic
progress and receiving quality educational opportunities. An analogous
argument led the U.S. Supreme Court to require only minimal due process
for short-term suspensions and a more formal process for expulsions and
suspensions longer than ten days.234 If accurate, this argument would negate
almost the entirety of the analysis in Part II, as expulsions comprise a very
small percentage of school exclusions.235
This argument overlooks two major points. First, the harm of a shortterm suspension extends well beyond the time that a student misses from
school. A single suspension significantly depresses academic achievement
for the remainder of the year and in subsequent years.236 Moreover, after a
student is suspended once, his or her chances of subsequent suspension and

233

See generally MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 22–29 (2009) (discussing separation of powers holdings). See, e.g., Coal.
for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996); McDaniel
v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167–68 (Ga. 1981).
234
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
235
See, e.g., EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12
SCHOOL SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 5 (2012) (finding
that in Southern states “427,768 Black boys were suspended and 14,643 were expelled”).
236
See, e.g., Edward W. Morris & Brea L. Perry, The Punishment Gap: School Suspension and
Racial Disparities in Achievement, 63 SOC. PROBLEMS 68, 80–81 (2016); see also Section III.B.2.
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expulsion rise dramatically.237 In other words, all school exclusions,
regardless of their length, are very serious occurrences in the academic life
of a student. They cannot be minimized or distinguished simply by
measuring them in terms of the amount of time a student misses from
school.
Second, the standard showing for triggering constitutional scrutiny is
whether a plaintiff has suffered a substantial harm.238 If so, the requisite
scrutiny applies. The scrutiny does not slide based on the extent of the
harm. Thus, the question with suspensions would be whether they
substantially impair the right to education, not whether they are as serious
as an expulsion. The answer to the former is yes. Not only does a single
suspension decrease achievement and increase the chance of subsequent
suspension, studies show that the decrease is substantial—equivalent to
decreases that courts have found sufficient to state a claim in adequacy and
equity cases.239
The other objection one might raise to the foregoing arguments is that
schools jeopardize the learning of others and cannot maintain orderly
learning environments if they allow disruptive students to remain in the
classroom. Thus, schools have a compelling interest for suspending
students and doing so is necessary to achieve that interest. Social science
does not, however, support this seemingly common-sense objection either.
Part III explores the literature on this point in detail. For now, it suffices to
say that studies show that suspension is an ineffective tool for maintaining
order in schools. First, suspensions do not improve the behavior of students
once they return to school.240 Second, the decision to routinely suspend
237

TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 37–38 (2011),
http://issuu.com/csgjustice/docs/breaking_schools_rules_report_final-1/1?e=2448066/1603396
[https://perma.cc/PQF6-KE6V]; Linda M. Raffaele Mendez, Predictors of Suspension and Negative
School Outcomes: A Longitudinal Investigation, 99 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV. 7, 25, 29–30
(2003); Tary Tobin et al., Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records, 4 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV.
DISORDERS 82, 91 (1996).
238
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 816–17 (outlining a prima facie fundamental
rights claim).
239
Compare ANDY WHISMAN & PATRICIA CAHAPE HAMMER, W. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE: A CASE FOR POSITIVE
DISCIPLINE APPROACHES, at v (2014) (explaining that suspended students are 2.4 times more likely to
score below proficient), and Morris & Perry, supra note 236, at 80–81 (finding students suspended once
actually regressed academically over the course of two years), with Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State,
599 S.E.2d. 365, 382 (N.C. 2004) (examining student proficiency on tests to assess whether they had
been deprived of an adequate education). See also infra Section III.B.3.
240
Instead, suspension reinforces misbehavior and also simply makes it more likely that schools
would impose suspension again for misbehavior. See, e.g., Mendez, supra note 237, at 29–30. Thus, the
policy of suspending students for minor misbehavior is really just the first step in adopting discipline
policies that will escalate, increasing punishment until students are funneled into the juvenile justice
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students for minor misbehavior alters the overall learning climate241 and,
thereby, depresses the academic achievement of well-behaved students,242
whose education schools are purportedly acting to protect. In sum, while
schools might assert an interest in maintaining school order, suspensions do
not actually serve that interest. Moreover, asserting as much falsely pits
misbehaving students against other students. Part III seeks to reframe the
debate over school discipline and demonstrate that all students’ interests
are aligned with discipline policies that rely far less heavily on suspensions
and expulsions.
III. EQUAL AND ADEQUATE EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES
AS A FUNCTION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
While courts should recognize students’ constitutional right to
education and limit attempts by the state to withdraw that education, far
more is at stake for the education system as a whole. Ineffective discipline
harms everyone in school—from the misbehaving student to his peers to a
school’s overall academic quality. These later problems, however, call for a
different analysis than Part II. The effects of a school environment and
disciplinary policies on the overall school and its academic outcomes raise
systemic questions. These questions go to the same core disputes that have
dominated school finance litigation for the past half-century. These
disputes do not center on whether students have individual rights, but
whether the state is carrying out its constitutional duty to provide equal and
adequate education opportunities.
As detailed in Section I.B, school finance precedent is built on several
key principles. Both individually and collectively, these principles bring to
the fore new and developing social science on the connection between
discipline practices, school quality, and academic achievement. The state
has the ultimate and final constitutional duty to ensure equal and adequate
education opportunities. That duty extends beyond just money to nearly
any educational policy or practice that deprives students of the educational
opportunity their state constitution mandates. It also includes monitoring
and supporting local districts to ensure students receive these opportunities.
A number of demographic groups are particularly at risk of academic

system. See generally BROWNE, supra note 12 (identifying and critiquing a discipline system that
amounts to a schoolhouse-to-jailhouse track).
241
See, e.g., RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL AUTHORITY 34
(2003) (students perceive discipline as random and unfair when it is too strict); Perry & Morris, supra
note 11, at 1083.
242
Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1068.
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failure and the state must devote particular attention and resources to
ensure these students can overcome academic barriers.243
New and developing social science lies at the core of these principles.
Social science increasingly demonstrates that while student misbehavior is
a function of individual choices that students make, individual student
misbehavior is also a function of the school environment in which they
learn and act.244 Quality schools and orderly environments consistently
produce higher student achievement and less misbehavior.245 Low-quality
schools with disorderly, hostile, and punitive environments produce lower
student achievement and higher rates of suspension and expulsion.246
Finally, because minority students disproportionately attend schools with
problematic discipline policies, their academic outcomes are particularly
depressed, which has the effect of widening achievement gaps.247 Thus,
reforming these discipline policies is one of the keys to delivering the equal
and adequate education that school finance precedent mandates. The
following Sections lay out this social science in detail and, for the first
time, situate it within school finance precedent.
A. Social Science Connections Between
Discipline and Student Achievement
1. School Exclusion Depresses Academic Achievement.—Some of
the connections between discipline and student achievement are relatively
obvious. For instance, studies consistently show that the amount of time
spent in school and the quality of instruction and learning during that time
directly affect achievement.248 If students are in environments that interfere
with their ability to focus on schoolwork, their academic achievement
suffers.249 If they are not in any school environment at all because they have
243

See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 388–89 (agreeing with the trial court “that
neither the State nor . . . [the Hoke County School System] are strategically allocating the available
resources to see that at-risk children have the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.”).
244
Infra notes 276–85.
245
Infra notes 248–75.
246
Infra notes 248–75.
247
Infra notes 286–310.
248
See generally Jere Brophy, Research Linking Teacher Behavior to Student Achievement:
Potential Implications for Instruction of Chapter 1 Students, 23 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 235 (1988) (“[T]he
key to achievement gain by low-achieving students is maximizing the time that they spend being
actively instructed or supervised by their teachers.”); Arthur J. Reynolds & Herbert J. Walberg, A
Structural Model of Science Achievement, 83 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 97 (Mar. 1991) (“[I]nstructional time
also proved instrumental in the achievement process by mediating the effects of other factors.”).
249
INA V.S. MULLIS ET AL., TRENDS IN INT’L MATHEMATICS AND SCI. STUDIES, TIMSS 2011
INTERNATIONAL RESULTS IN MATHEMATICS 263–64 (2012) (finding lower achievement in disorderly
schools in an analysis of international math scores); Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, A Multilevel
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been suspended or expelled, their academic achievement suffers.250 If
students’ teachers are regularly pulled away from instruction to deal with
discipline of one student, the academic achievement of other students
suffers.251 Studies find that, even after accounting for demographic
variables, standardized test scores closely track suspension rates. Thus, to
no surprise, schools with the most suspensions have the lowest test
scores.252
Current research goes far beyond the simplistic notion that if
misbehaving students are disrupting their classmates, their classmates learn
less. If that were all the data revealed, schools might reasonably exclude
the misbehaving student in the interest of preserving the educational
environment for others. Nuanced studies indicate that a school’s approach
to discipline and frequency of suspensions heavily influence student
achievement.253 Even after controlling for race, poverty, and school type,
suspension rates predict more than one-third of a school’s overall academic
achievement.254 With all other things being equal, academic achievement is
lower in schools with higher suspension rates.255 As one study put it,
“serving a high percentage of poor minority children does not mean that a
Model of the Social Distribution of High School Achievement, 62 SOC. OF EDUC. 172, 189 (1989) (“At a
purely behavioral level, a minimum of disciplinary problems is a necessary condition for the routine
pursuit of academic work.”).
250
See, e.g., James Earl Davis & Will J. Jordan, The Effects of School Context, Structure, and
Experiences on African American Males in Middle and High School, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 570, 581–83
(1994); see also Terrance M. Scott & Susan B. Barrett, Using Staff and Student Time Engaged in
Disciplinary Procedures to Evaluate the Impact of School-Wide PBS, 6 J. POSITIVE BEHAV.
INTERVENTIONS 21, 24 (2004) (detailing the time schools spend on disciplinary matters that could
otherwise be spent on instruction and learning).
251
See generally Scott & Barrett, supra note 250, at 23 (discussing the amount of time teachers
spend on disciplining students rather than instruction).
252
RUSSELL J. SKIBA ET AL., CONSISTENT REMOVAL: CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE TO
THE SCHOOL-PRISON PIPELINE 29 (2003) (“[I]ncreased rates of school exclusion are correlated with
lower achievement test scores.”); RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 9, 18–19 (reviewing studies that
find, for instance, “that a school’s emphasis on discipline and the number of suspensions a student
received negatively predicted achievement in mathematics, science, and history even when controlling
for a number of other variables including socio-economic status”).
253
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., ZERO TOLERANCE, supra note 220, at 12; Pamela Fenning &
Jennifer Rose, Overrepresentation of African American Students in Exclusionary Discipline: The Role
of School Policy, 42 URBAN EDUC. 536, 548 (2007) (finding that suspension and expulsion are related
to school policies and factors not characteristics internal to students); Shi-Chang Wu et al., Student
Suspension: A Critical Reappraisal, 14 URBAN REV. 245, 271–72 (1982); see also Gathogo Mukuria,
Disciplinary Challenges: How Do Principals Address This Dilemma?, 37 URBAN EDUC. 432, 449
(2002) (“[P]rincipals in schools with low suspension rates care and have concern for the students. These
findings are consistent with the work of Lomotey (1991), who found that effective African American
principals have sympathy and concern for their students.”).
254
RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 16 (describing a suspension model that “includes sociodemographic variables [and] accounted for a moderately high amount of the total school variation in
achievement scores (Adjusted r2 = 53.2%), explaining an additional 36.1% of the total variation”).
255
Id.
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school will necessarily have a high suspension rate,”256 but having a high
suspension rate does seem to mean that academic achievement, as
measured by test scores, will decline.257
These findings would appear to fly in the face of conventional wisdom
that believes excluding misbehaving students ensures orderly learning
environments for everyone else.258 The explanation lies in the fact that
while schools must address and prevent misbehavior, how schools respond
matters immensely. First, schools’ response to student misbehavior—not
just the misbehavior itself—affects the learning environment.259 Suspending
students on a regular basis negatively affects the general student body’s
perception of school authority and the school’s climate.260
Second, as discipline becomes overly strict or harsh, the general
student body—including well-behaved students—begins to perceive school
authorities as arbitrary and unfair.261 At that point, students may have any
number of negative reactions, including resentment, opposition, fear, or
disillusionment.262 Some students who previously had no behavioral
problems begin to act out, and misbehavior among “bad” students becomes
all the more frequent.263 Schools that persist in the idea that the problems
with the school climate stem solely from misbehaving students, rather than
the school’s discipline policies, can spiral into complete dysfunction.264 In
256

Mendez et al., supra note 154, at 273 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 261.
258
See, e.g., Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1083 (“[T]he most common rationale for
maintaining ‘tough’ exclusionary discipline policies . . . [is] that removing disruptive students creates a
safe, orderly environment conducive to learning for students who conform to school rules.”).
259
See generally ARUM, supra note 241; Fenning & Rose, supra note 253, at 538–39 (emphasizing
schools’ ability to implement alternative discipline regimes that alter and improve school climate).
260
See, e.g., ARUM, supra note 241 (noting that the harshness of discipline negatively affects how
the overall student body perceives school climate and authority); see also Davis & Jordan, supra note
250, at 26 (discussing the possible linkage between school climate and student achievement).
261
ARUM, supra note 241, at 156.
262
Id. at 182 (stating that students who perceived school discipline as unfair “had a 35 percent
likelihood of expressing a willingness to disobey rules” compared to 5% when discipline was perceived
as fair).
263
See generally ARUM, supra note 241, at 155–57, 181–82 (discussing an overall increase in
students’ perception of disciplinary unfairness as discipline becomes more strict, as well as increased
willingness to disregard school rules); Mendez, supra note 237 (finding suspension is a predictor of
later misbehavior).
264
Out of control dysfunction helps explain why some schools in Washington, D.C. and New
Orleans have suspension rates as high as 50% and 75%, meaning that in a school with 400 students, the
schools will impose 200 to 300 suspensions in a single year. See EVERY STUDENT EVERY DAY COAL.,
supra note 4, at 4 tbl.2 (indicating that the three highest suspending middle schools in the District of
Columbia public school system have suspension rates of 67% to 72%); Kari Harden, Civil Rights
Complaints Are Filed Against Three N.O. Schools, LOUISIANA WEEKLY (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/civil-rights-complaints-are-filed-against-three-n-o-schools/
[https://perma.cc/EG5L-KMQH] (discussing a civil rights complaint against a charter school with a
257
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short, schools cannot simply suspend their way out of discipline
problems.265
Third, negative climates seemingly combine with escalating student
misbehavior to drive down the academic achievement of “innocent
bystanders.”266 New studies focus on how innocent bystanders suffer the
“collateral consequences” of harsh discipline policies.267 Tracking student
suspensions and math achievement across years, researchers find that high
levels of exclusionary discipline negatively affect the academic
achievement of nonsuspended students.268 The effect is strongest in schools
with low levels of violence and high levels of exclusionary discipline.269
Finally, environmental climates and student achievement also have
reciprocal effects on students’ access to the most vital educational resource:
quality teachers.270 Teachers in negative environments are more likely to be
absent from school, transfer schools, or quit teaching altogether.271 The
result is a further lowering of instructional and teacher quality in these
schools.272 The lowering of the quality of teaching further depresses a

68% suspension rate). These schools do not have the worst students in the nation; they have the worst
school climates.
265
See generally Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 20, at 81. If zero tolerance policies eliminated
troublemakers, “the initial jump in zero tolerance removals would fall off as troublemakers were
expelled. Instead, schools are expelling and suspending ever larger numbers of students.” Id.
266
See Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1067 (finding that the academic achievement of students
who are not suspended goes down when suspension rates are high).
267
These consequences are analogous to those that flow from the mass incarceration in certain
adult communities. Id.
268
Id. at 1077 (explaining that in schools with above average suspension rates “we see an adverse
effect of school suspension [on non-suspended students] that becomes especially pronounced at greaterthan-one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., the top one-third of schools) . . . [while] [i]n schools
with low levels of violence (one standard deviation below the mean), the negative effect of out-ofschool suspension is very strong at high levels of suspension”).
269
Id.
270
Dan Goldhaber & Emily Anthony, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement, 115 ERIC
CLEARINGHOUSE ON URBAN EDUC. 1 (2003) (sharing research that shows “teacher quality is the most
important educational input predicting student achievement”); Megan Hopkins, A Vision for the Future:
Collective Effort for Systemic Change, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 737, 737 (2008) (finding that quality of
the teacher is the most important factor in student development, especially for low-income students of
color).
271
See Geoffrey D. Borman & N. Maritza Dowling, Teacher Attrition and Retention: A MetaAnalytic and Narrative Review of the Research, 78 REV. OF EDUC. RESEARCH 367, 397 (2008) (finding
school environment and conditions to be a significant explanation of teacher turnover). This matters
because teacher attendance and retention directly affect student performance. Davis & Jordan, supra
note 250, at 581 (“[T]eacher absences had the strongest association with Black male achievement.”).
272
See, e.g., LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 93, 118, 208, 314 (2010) (discussing the
disincentive to teach students who are challenging to teach, how achievement variations across districts
correlate with access to quality teachers, how teacher perceptions of students interfere with constructive
interactions, and the connection between attrition and teacher quality).
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school’s academic achievement,273 which makes it more difficult to attract
quality teachers.274 In short, once climate, discipline, achievement, and
teacher quality begin to interact negatively, a vicious cycle can form, from
which it is hard to escape.275
2. Schools’ Approach to Discipline Matters.—The primary lessons
of the foregoing research are that schools have a choice in how they
approach discipline and that choice matters for student behavior and
student achievement. While some level of student misbehavior is a given,
how educators respond is a choice.276 Schools are not passive participants in
suspensions and expulsions, simply reacting to the unfortunate environment
and circumstances they face.277 Rather, schools themselves are also
responsible for student misbehavior and the number of suspensions they
impose.278 As one researcher concluded after analyzing the data, students
“interested in reducing their chances of being suspended . . . [would] be
better off by transferring to a school with a lower suspension rate rather
than by improving their attitudes or reducing their misbehavior.”279
273

See, e.g., Davis & Jordan, supra note 250, at 584–85 (finding that students achieved the lowest
in classrooms where teachers assigned the least work and had the lowest expectations and these factors
interacted with the overall disciplinary environment); Xin Ma & J. Douglas Willms, School
Disciplinary Climate: Characteristics and Effects on Eighth Grade Achievement, 50 ALBERTA J. EDUC.
RES. 169, 180–82 (2004) (finding that students’ perceptions of their school’s disciplinary climate were
significantly correlated to student achievement across subjects).
274
As one study demonstrated, teachers prefer to work in predominantly white and middle-income
schools. Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 326,
337 (2004). But the effect of this preference can be to further depress needy students’ access to quality
teachers, which reinforces the achievement gap. See generally HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK,
EDUC. TRUST, TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON
TEACHER QUALITY 11 (2006), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED494820.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XN86AB] (examining unequal access to quality teachers and its effect on educational opportunity).
275
Findings and Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, Reed v. State, No. BC432420, at
28–29, 2011 WL 10893745, at *16 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011) (“[S]chools with high teacher turnover can
fall into a ‘vicious cycle’ in which the high turnover itself makes it more difficult to recruit and retain
teachers, contributing to continued high turnover.”).
276
RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 22.
277
Id. (explaining that while “some portion of a school’s suspensions and expulsions are due to
student misbehavior and anti-social attitudes,” the remainder is a product of “a complex and multidetermined [administrative] process”).
278
See, e.g., ANNE WHEELOCK, MASS. ADVOCACY CTR., THE WAY OUT: STUDENT EXCLUSION
PRACTICES IN BOSTON MIDDLE SCHOOLS (1986); Mukuria, supra note 253, at 449 (finding that
principal attitudes rather than student behavior played a significant factor in suspension rates); Dona M.
Kagan, How Schools Alienate Students at Risk: A Model for Examining Proximal Classroom Variables,
25 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 105, 107 (1990) (noting a study that found different discipline outcomes when
students transferred to a new school); SKIBA ET AL., CONSISTENT REMOVAL, supra note 252, at 31–32
(finding that school exclusion can lead to increased individual and community risk); see also Russell J.
Skiba et al., Office Referrals and Suspension: Disciplinary Intervention in Middle Schools, 20 EDUC. &
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 295, 311 (1997) (finding that students are treated differently in different
classes).
279
Wu et al., supra note 253, at 255–56.
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The key is to constructively engage students. Schools with low
suspension rates use “prevention strategies to curtail inappropriate behavior
(e.g., social skills training for students, behavior management training for
teachers),” get parents involved “in the development of the school-wide
discipline plan,” and believe “that responding to students’ needs and
treating them with respect is effective in reducing problematic behavior.”280
The general consensus of the research community is that positive
behavioral supports, not punitive responses, are the most effective way to
address student misbehavior.281 Likewise, misbehavior is often a coping
mechanism for students struggling to overcome academic challenges, not a
sign of bad behavior per se.282 The way to address an academic challenge is
to provide academic support.283 Exclusion just makes matters worse.284
The foregoing sophisticated analysis of school discipline and student
achievement has the potential to entirely reframe the nature of discipline
problems. It shows that student misbehavior is not just about students
making bad choices or schools overreacting to those choices. Student
misbehavior is contextual and depends on the quality of the social and
academic environment. Likewise, students’ academic achievement is not
just about how hard students study or how qualified their teachers are.
Academic achievement is a function of the social and disciplinary
environment in the school. Understood this way, states and schools have far
more leverage to improve discipline and academic outcomes than one
280

Mendez et al., supra note 154, at 273–74.
Nance, supra note 14 (surveying and discussing the literature on positive behavioral supports
and noting that the benefits have been verified in thousands of schools).
282
VERN JONES & LOUISE JONES, COMPREHENSIVE CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: CREATING
COMMUNITIES OF SUPPORT AND SOLVING PROBLEMS (7th ed. 2004); João Lopes, Intervention with
Students with Learning, Emotional, and Behavior Disorders: Why Do We Take So Long to Do It?,
28 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 345, 348–49 (2005); J. Ron Nelson et al., Academic
Achievement of K-12 Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 71 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
59, 67–68 (2004); Heather E. Sterling-Turner et al., Functional Assessment of Distracting and
Disruptive Behaviors in the School Setting, 30 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 219–221 (2001) (discussing a
case study of a child acting out to avoid difficult tasks).
283
See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 337 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining that sound basic education
“must still ‘be placed within reach of all students,’ including those who ‘present with socioeconomic
deficits’”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389 n.16 (N.C. 2004) (discussing at-risk
students whom the state was obligated to assist); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 179
(S.C. 2014) (emphasizing the state’s duty to assist “school districts filled with students of the most
disadvantaged socioeconomic background”).
284
The students fall further behind and the chances of dropping out increase dramatically. ROBERT
BALFANZ ET AL., SENT HOME AND PUT OFF-TRACK: THE ANTECEDENTS, DISPROPORTIONALITIES, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF BEING SUSPENDED IN THE NINTH GRADE (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prisonfolder/state-reports/sent-home-and-put-off-track-the-antecedents-disproportionalities-andconsequences-of-being-suspended-in-the-ninth-grade/balfanz-sent-home-ccrr-conf-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W5YE-S7GC].
281
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might otherwise assume. In fact, schools are and have been leveraging their
power for some time. The problem is that they have too often used that
leverage to suspend and expel students,285 which has undermined both the
discipline climate and academic achievement.
3. The Racial Achievement Gap as a Function of Discipline.—Harsh
discipline policies potentially pose academic impediments for all students
and schools. Schools, however, do not administer discipline evenly across
demographic groups and schools. Most notably, African-Americans are
suspended at anywhere from two to five times as often as white students,
depending on the particular state and school.286 These higher suspension
rates, combined with the differing disciplinary climate in predominantly
minority schools, fuel the racial achievement gap. In 2015, for instance, the
U.S. Department of Education reported that African-American’s math
achievement lagged thirty-two points behind that of whites by the eighth
grade on the National Assessment of Educational Progress—the equivalent
of about three years’ worth of learning.287
For decades, social science has attributed the racial achievement gap
to poverty, segregation, and unequal access to resources.288 No doubt, these
factors still influence the achievement gap. But recent studies reveal that a
substantial portion of the achievement gap is attributable to problematic
discipline policy and practices, which just so happen to be more prevalent
285

See generally LOSEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (“If we ignore the discipline gap, we will be
unable to close the achievement gap. Of the 3.5 million students who were suspended in 2011-12, 1.55
million were suspended at least twice. Given that the average suspension is conservatively put at 3.5
days, we estimate that U.S. public school children lost nearly 18 million days of instruction in just one
school year because of exclusionary discipline.”).
286
EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES (2015),
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9RT-WGG7].
287
NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2016, at 152 fig.3
(2016), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016144.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y9K-C828] (showing the gap);
CHRISTOPHER LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, NAT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
PRIVATIZATION IN EDUC., CHARTER, PRIVATE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS. AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT: NEW
EVIDENCE FROM NAEP MATHEMATICS DATA 5 (2006), http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/articles/EPRU-0601137-OWI.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RM3-BPG4] (explaining that ten scaled points on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress is roughly equivalent to one year of learning).
288
See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, at 153
app.A, tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009) http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2ZMZ-5BL5] (revealing achievement gaps between white and black students equivalent to nearly two
years of learning); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21–22 (1966), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED012275 [https://perma.cc/
WW99-LNL9] (attributing achievement gap to socioeconomic segregation); C. Kirabo Jackson et al.,
The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic Achievement and
Adult Outcomes, Q.J. ECON (forthcoming 2016), www.nber.org/papers/w20118 [https://perma.cc/
FKP3-N53F] (attributing achievement gaps to resource inequalities).
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in predominantly poor and minority schools.289 As a result, AfricanAmericans, on average, confront a disciplinary environment that depresses
rather than improves student achievement. Based on these findings, the
solution to harsh and counterproductive discipline may also be a solution,
in part, to the racial achievement gap—two issues often considered
separately.290
Given the complexity of the analysis, the research on these points is
relatively new and scarce. However, two major studies offer compelling
findings.291 The first study reached the general finding that the percentage
of low- or middle-income students in a school strongly correlates with the
disciplinary climate and academic achievement in that school.292 Therefore,
if the extent of segregation in school districts or communities increases, . . .
there will be an increase in the variation of both disciplinary climate and
academic achievement at the school level. In schools where advantaged
students are concentrated, there will be fewer discipline problems and higher
achievement levels, whereas schools serving disadvantaged students will have
even worse discipline problems and lower levels of academic achievement.293

The second study, by Richard Arum and Melissa Velez, confirmed
this finding,294 but went much further in its analysis and conclusions. Arum
and Velez attempted to quantify the extent to which the general racial
achievement gap is attributable to discipline. Although an exact answer is
289

See infra notes 291–311.
See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 220, at 7–8
(framing discipline issues in terms of school pushouts and juvenile justice involvement, not academic
achievement); CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps, THE EDUC.
OPPORTUNITY MONITORING PROJECT, http://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunity-monitoringproject/achievement-gaps/race/ [https://perma.cc/ZY2F-YNWB] (indicating much of the achievement
gap is attributable to poverty factors, but listing several other nondiscipline-related education policies
that may make matters worse—“the availability and quality of early childhood education, the quality of
public schools, patterns of residential and school segregation, and state educational and social
policies”).
291
Another less sophisticated study preceded the two studies discussed above the line, but reached
consistent results. In 1989, Valerie Lee and Anthony Bryk found that the average achievement gap
between African-Americans and whites was smaller in Catholic schools than public schools, but the
difference between the schools
disappeared once we took into account the disciplinary climate of schools. The minority gap is
largest in schools in which there is a high incidence of disciplinary problems. This finding
suggests that the minority gap is smaller in the Catholic sector because the environments are more
orderly and less disruptive.
Lee & Bryk, supra note 249, at 185.
292
Ma & Willms, supra note 273, at 185.
293
Id.
294
Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 298 (“[S]chools with more than 50 percent of students from
economically disadvantaged homes have significantly higher levels of principal reports of disciplinary
disengagement.”).
290
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elusive given the number of factors involved in the gap, they were able to
link discipline and the racial achievement gap.
They first replicated the longstanding research findings regarding the
negative effects of attending a high-poverty school on student achievement,
regardless of an individual student’s race or socioeconomic status, and the
positive effects of attending a middle-income school.295 They also accepted
the premise in that literature that differences in peer-to-peer learning, the
ability to recruit high quality teachers, and other related factors drive the
achievement gap between high- and low-poverty schools.296 But Arum and
Velez found that there was a potentially even more important difference
between schools: “a large and significant component of the negative effects
of attending economically disadvantaged schools on test score performance
is associated with the dysfunctional disciplinary climates that exist
there.”297
The average African-American student attends a school in which 59%
of his peers are low income.298 Arum and Velez found that these
predominantly poor schools are more likely to have dysfunctional
discipline environments than other schools.299 This tendency of
predominantly poor schools combined with the fact that African-Americans
are consigned to them at a much higher rate than whites means that
African-Americans are exposed to a very different disciplinary
environment than whites.300 This differential exposure, according to Arum
and Velez, largely explains the racial achievement gap. They found that
nearly half of the achievement gap that researchers normally attribute to
segregation is cancelled out when disciplinary measures are considered.301
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COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 21–22; RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW:
CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 47–76 (2001); Geoffrey D.
Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multi-Level Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of
Educational Opportunity Data, 112 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 1201, 1201–02 (2010).
296
Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 279–81.
297
Id. at 302.
298
GARY ORFIELD, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGE 14 (2009), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-society-a-21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goalmlk-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TKF-YCDK].
299
Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 295, 297–98 (finding that socioeconomically disadvantaged
schools have classroom disruptions that are a standard deviation higher than other schools, and also
have poorer climates and less disciplinary engagement by staff and administrators).
300
Id. at 298.
301
Arum & Velez, supra note 33, at 302 (finding that 45% of the variance in the achievement
between African-Americans attending high- and low-poverty schools is attributable to the differences in
the disciplinary environment in those schools). Some variance in achievement persisted even after
accounting for differences in the disciplinary environment, but the study found the remaining variance
was statistically insignificant. Id. at 317.
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In a separate analysis, they also found that in more orderly environments,
the racial achievement gap is “diminished to nearly zero” (after controlling
for demographic factors).302 In sum, Arum and Velez’s study suggests
decades of social science documenting the negative interaction between
segregation and the academic achievement of African-Americans is
explained by the fact that African-Americans generally experience
disciplinary climates that depress academic achievement at much higher
rates than whites.303
Another recent study sought to quantify the academic effects of
differential discipline within individual schools. In 2016, Edward Morris
and Brea Perry published what they call “the first comprehensive study of
the impact of suspension on racial differences in achievement.”304 They
found that “school suspensions account for approximately one-fifth of
black–white differences in school performance.”305
This connection proceeds from three straightforward subsidiary
factual findings. First, African-American students are far more likely to be
suspended than other students. In the schools studied, African-Americans
were “7.57 times as likely to be suspended as white students.”306 While this
disparity could be partially explained by differences in socioeconomic
status, eligibility for special education, and whether a student lived with a
two-parent family, these factors could not cancel out the disparity.
Accounting for all available factors, “black students are still estimated to be
nearly two and a half times as likely to be suspended as white students.”307
Second, “[s]tudents who have been suspended score substantially
lower on end-of-year academic progress tests than those who have not, and
even students with a propensity to be suspended perform worse in years
where they are suspended relative to years when they are not.”308 Third, the
negative effects of the initial suspension compound over time and set “into
motion a trajectory of poor performance that continues in subsequent years,
even if a student is not suspended again.”309 Over the course of two years,
the average student who did not experience a suspension experienced a sixpoint increase in achievement on end-of-year exams, while students who
302

Id. at 317.
Id. at 320.
304
Edward W. Morris & Brea L. Perry, The Punishment Gap: School Suspension and Racial
Disparities in Achievement, 63 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 68, 71 (2016).
305
Id. at 68.
306
Id. at 76.
307
Id. at 77.
308
Id. at 82.
309
Id.
303
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experienced a single suspension actually regressed by one point during that
same period.310 The authors conclude that these findings demonstrate that
the racially “unequal suspension rate is one of the most important factors
hindering academic progress and maintaining the racial gap in
achievement.”311
In sum, the foregoing studies suggest that the academic impacts of
discipline policies and practices are strong and that they explain a
substantial amount of the achievement gap. Differences in the disciplinary
environments between predominantly poor and predominantly middleincome schools explain a substantial amount of the achievement gap
between those schools. Moreover, even within individual schools,
differential rates of suspension explain a substantial portion of the
achievement gap between students, as the decision to suspend a student
will widen whatever achievement gap may already exist between that
student and others.
B. Situating School Discipline Research Within
School Finance Frameworks
Social science connecting educational outcomes with discipline
policies directly intersects with the state’s obligation to ensure that schools
are delivering adequate and equal educational opportunities, particularly for
disadvantaged students. A state’s obligations to provide schools with
sufficient funding, teachers, curriculum, and facilities to ensure adequate
educational opportunities is theoretically no different than an obligation to
manage and implement effective discipline policies. The existence of a
positive disciplinary environment, just like the presence of quality teachers,
will determine whether many students achieve on grade level and graduate.
Conversely, just like ineffective teaching, a lack of engaging curriculum, or
dangerous facilities, a negative disciplinary environment will increase
students’ chances of academic failure, suspension, and eventually dropping
out of school.
When schools combine negative disciplinary environments with high
percentages of at-risk students, the results are often catastrophic. The gap
between the academic outcomes in these schools and others is significant.
Even for the well-behaved students, the chance of receiving a quality
education and achieving academic success are low. While these
310

Id. at 79–80. “Suspended students have lower baseline scores than never-suspended students, on
average, possibly reflecting other unmeasured mechanisms of student success that are correlated with
suspension,” but suspension widens this gap from “only a three-point deficit relative to those without a
suspension” to a nine-point gap after two years. Id.
311
Id.
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achievement gaps have been central to past litigation, school discipline and
the environmental climate have largely been ignored as causal factors.
Until school quality litigation accounts for discipline, it will too often fall
short of ensuring the quality and equal education opportunities it pursues.
Unlike the theory in Part II, this claim does not depend on the
existence of a constitutional right to education. Rather, this claim rests on
the state’s duty to deliver adequate and equal educational opportunities.
Where that duty exists, plaintiffs can challenge ineffective discipline policy
by establishing four additional points. First, plaintiffs must show that the
duty to deliver an adequate or equal education includes the duty to maintain
effective discipline policies. Second, plaintiffs must show that ineffective
disciplinary environments cause a substantial educational harm. Third,
plaintiffs must show that the state, rather than students or some other
factor, cause that harm. Fourth, plaintiffs may also need to demonstrate that
strategies are available to reduce or eliminate the harm. These steps do not
require plaintiffs to develop new doctrine, but simply to make an
evidentiary case connecting discipline policies and data to school quality
and student achievement.
1. The Constitutional Duty Includes Discipline.—Plaintiffs in
discipline cases, like those in school finance and quality cases, could base
their claim on access to an adequate or equal education. Even without
establishing an individual personal constitutional right to education,
plaintiffs could base their claim on the state’s constitutional duty to deliver
education. All state constitutions include this duty.312 The only variance
among states is whether the state supreme court enforces that duty.313 So
long as plaintiffs brought a claim in a state that exercised that authority,
establishing an educational duty that the courts will enforce is not a barrier
to pursuing a discipline claim.
The question would then be whether discipline policy and practice fall
within this duty. This question is both doctrinal and empirical. As to
doctrine, Section II.B demonstrates adequacy and equity precedent is
sufficiently broad to cover almost any education policy or practice that
significantly affects educational outcomes. Courts have entertained
adequacy and equity claims ranging from challenges to school district
boundaries and segregation, teacher tenure, limited access to charter
schools, low teacher salaries, school funding, and the absence of pre-
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Thro, supra note 21.
Weishart, supra note 184. In those states where courts do not enforce this duty, plaintiffs would
presumably be unable to challenge discipline policy. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar,
672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994).
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kindergarten education.314 Discipline policy, insofar as it can entirely cut
short the education of misbehaving students and determine the quality of
the learning environment for other students, easily fits in the category of
education policies that affect education outcomes.315 Thus, as a matter of
doctrine, plaintiffs can raise it.
The more difficult question is the empirical one of whether discipline
policy causes education harms that are substantial and systemic enough to
rise to a deprivation of an adequate or equal education.316 If so, a court
might order an affirmative remedy by the state.317 If not, a court would
likely find that the state has not breached its duty.318 The following Sections
explore this empirical question and its subsidiary inquiries in detail.
2.

Establishing the General Causal Connection Between Discipline
and Educational Opportunities.—The most challenging empirical
showings in cases claiming that the state has failed to deliver equal or
adequate educational opportunities all center around issues of causation.
When plaintiffs challenge some particular deficiency in their education,
they must establish that (1) the deficiency has a causal impact on
educational opportunity; (2) that the impact is substantial enough to
conclude that students have been denied an equal or adequate education;
and (3) that the state, rather than some other factor, has caused or is in
some way responsible for the deficiency.
For instance, past cases have often alleged that students have been
deprived of an adequate education because of the poor teaching quality in
314

See supra notes 80–87.
As Kevin Welner reasons, if the constitutional challenge to teacher tenure fits within existing
precedent regarding the fundamental right to education, “[o]ther lawsuits might challenge laws and
policies that result in inequities in class size, access to high-quality preschool, grade retention,
exclusionary discipline, access to enriched and engaging curriculum, transportation, buildings and
facilities, funding formulas, access to and use of technology, testing and accountability policies, and
school choice policies.” Kevin G. Welner, Silver Linings Casebook: How Vergara’s Backers May Lose
by Winning, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 121, 141 (2015).
316
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating “[a]n
insubstantial burden” is insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267,
1287 (Conn. 1996) (requiring more than a “de minimus” injury); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989) (examining inequities throughout 177 local school districts); McDuffy
v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519–22 (Mass. 1993) (examining violations
spanning across twelve districts).
317
See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997) (directing the state to ensure an
appropriate student–teacher ratio); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo.), as
clarified on denial of reh’g, (Wyo. 1995) (directing the state to “achieve financial parity,” conduct a
study of “a new funding system,” “describe what a ‘proper education’ is,” set “meaningful standards for
course content and knowledge attainment,” and assess student progress).
318
See, e.g., Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (overturning trial court
decision in favor of plaintiffs), as modified, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2016), reh’g
denied, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016).
315
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their school or district.319 Those plaintiffs substantiated their case by
showing that teacher quality correlates with student achievement, that
teacher quality is one of the most important variables in student
achievement, that uncertified and unqualified teachers are prevalent in
schools with poor academic outcomes, and that the reason for these
teaching inadequacies is the state’s funding policy.320
Showings of this sort are typically made through a combination of
social science studies, locally generated data, and statistical analysis. These
studies and data rarely establish causation in any absolute sense, but they
offer the circumstantial evidence upon which a court can infer causation.321
This inference is most important on the general questions of whether an
educational input or policy correlates with educational outcomes. Based on
a strong correlation, a court can infer that an input, such as teacher quality,
has a causal effect on achievement, graduation rates, or some other
education outcome.322 Once a court makes this causal inference, the other
factual and causal inquiries are more straightforward. If plaintiffs establish
that teacher quality affects education outcomes as a general matter, it might
be enough for plaintiffs to show that certain schools are exposed to high
numbers of low-quality teachers, that achievement in those schools is low,
and that some state policy prevents these schools from improving their
teacher quality.323
319

See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 261 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 744.
320
See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 498–99 (Ark. 2002) (noting that
“[w]ell-paid and well-motivated teachers are what make the education engine run,” but that they are not
paid equally across the state); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198 (“[T]here is great disparity in the poor and the
more affluent school districts with regard to classroom teachers’ pay.”); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333
(N.Y. 2003) (noting that teachers are the most important input for positive student outcomes).
321
See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 340 (“The trial court reasoned that the necessary ‘causal link’
between the present funding system and the poor performance of City schools could be established by a
showing that increased funding can provide better teachers, facilities and instrumentalities of
learning. . . . We agree that this showing, together with evidence that such improved inputs yield better
student performance, constituted plaintiffs’ prima facie case, which plaintiffs established.”).
322
See, e.g., id. at 334 (“[W]e agree with the trial court’s holdings that teacher certification, test
performance, experience and other factors measure quality of teaching; that quality of teaching
correlates with student performance”); CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995) (equating a
“correlation between funding and educational opportunity” with a “causal link”).
323
See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 171 (S.C. 2014) (finding a
deprivation of a minimally adequate education based on evidence that plaintiffs’ districts had higher
rates of teachers who were on temporary contracts or had failed a certification test, without requiring
evidence that those rates strongly correlated with lower student achievement), reh’g denied, (S.C.
2015). It is also worth noting that some courts, while requiring causation, do not require sophisticated
statistical analysis to establish it. Some courts accept the commonsense notion that certain key
education resources such as teachers and textbooks affect the education students receive and, thus, state
policies that create unequal or inadequate access to these resources deprive students of the
constitutionally required education. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976);
Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated sub nom., Askew v. Hargrave,
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In discipline, this would likely entail demonstrating that suspension
affects educational opportunities, those effects are substantial enough to
deprive students of an equal or adequate education, and that the state, rather
than students, are responsible for problematic discipline policies and high
suspension rates. The first point—that suspension affects educational
opportunities—is addressed in this Section, and the second and third points
regarding the level of harm caused and the party responsible for it are
addressed in the next two Sections.
Broad-scale studies showing that negative climates and high
suspension rates correlate with lower student achievement should be
sufficient for a court to make the general causal inference that high
suspension rates and disorderly environments affect educational
opportunity. For instance, studies show that a single suspension can
eliminate any educational progress a student would have made for the year
and that when this effect is compounded across a school with a high
suspension rate, the overall achievement of the entire student body—
including suspended and nonsuspended students—is depressed.324
Likewise, studies show that students in schools with better disciplinary
environments tend to score better than they otherwise would if they were in
schools with problematic disciplinary environments.325 These are the exact
types of effects that have sufficed in cases challenging teacher quality,
segregation, unequal funding, and other education policies.326
Jason Nance’s recent synthesis of discipline studies also offers a
qualitative explanation for the connection between discipline and the
overall educational quality of a school. He explains:
When teachers employ a varied-instructional approach that incorporates
activities that target different learning styles and students’ needs; capture the
students’ interests by making the material relevant to their lives; help students
understand what is possible through cooperation and coordinated action with

401 U.S. 476 (1971); see also Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be
Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1743–46 (2012) (discussing some courts’ simplistic approach to
causation).
324
See supra notes 248–75.
325
See Rausch & Skiba, supra note 8 (surveying past literature on the academic consequences of
discipline and reaching new empirical findings to the same effect).
326
See, e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287–88 (Conn. 1996) (finding that racial isolation
is harmful to students and is a constitutional violation); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL
22902963, at *49 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (“[T]he Court was persuaded, as a matter of fact, by the
evidence that there is a causal connection between the poor performance of the vulnerable and/or
protected categories of Kansas students and the low funding provided their schools.”); CFE II,
801 N.E.2d at 334 (correlation between teaching quality and student performance sufficient evidence of
deprivation of sound basic education).
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others; and have supportive, caring environments with clear behavioral
expectations, teachers experience far fewer behavioral problems.327

In other words, schools that deliver a quality education generally do not
have discipline problems, whereas those that deliver inadequate education
do.
In some respects, this explanation might blur the causal inquiry,
raising the question of the extent to which high suspension rates cause poor
academic outcomes versus the extent to which poor educational quality
causes high suspension rates and poor outcomes. These factors likely have
reciprocal effects on one another and this possibility need not undermine
plaintiffs’ claim. To the contrary, it should strengthen them. First, as the
strong connection between student achievement and discipline rates
suggest, orderly and positive disciplinary environments are part of a quality
education. In fact, this is the state’s very premise for excluding some
students.328 Second, as a general matter, the state is responsible for both the
quality of education it delivers and discipline policy outcomes.329 The state
should not escape its duty in regard to both by confounding the distinctions
between them. Finally, while education quality and suspensions surely
interact, studies show that when holding all other things equal, the decision
to police student behavior primarily through suspension correlates with
lower academic outcomes.330 This alone should be sufficient for courts to
infer the general causal connection between discipline and education
outcomes.
3.

Demonstrating the Effects of Discipline Policies Rise to the Level
of a Constitutional Harm.—The next step is to show the effect of
discipline is substantial and systematic enough to independently or in
conjunction with other policies deprive students of an adequate or equal
education. As to an individual student who is expelled, the substantiality of
the harm is obvious, but the systematic problem is not necessarily so. The
issue for the broader claim that the state has failed to carry out its education

327

Nance, supra note 14, at 347.
See, e.g., Leonard v. Sch. Comm., 212 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Mass. 1965) (upholding exclusion of
student based on his haircut because school believed it was necessary to protect order and classroom
decorum); In re Jackson, 352 S.E.2d 449, 455 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“A student’s right to an education
may be constitutionally denied when outweighed by the school’s interest in protecting other students,
teachers, and school property, and in preventing the disruption of the educational system.”).
329
Precedent clearly establishes state responsibility for educational quality. See, e.g., Rose v.
Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Pub.
Sch. Fin. Sys.), 765 A.2d 673, 676 (N.H. 2000) (“The State may not shift any of this constitutional
responsibility to local communities . . . .”). And as Section III.B.4 will establish, discipline outcomes
are a result of the state’s actions and inactions.
330
See supra notes 248–75.
328
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duty is whether discipline policies systematically affect the delivery of
education beyond individual students (or classrooms) and whether those
systematic effects deprive students of an adequate or equal education. For
instance, in the challenge to teacher tenure discussed in Section I.B.4,
plaintiffs had alleged that teacher tenure caused grossly ineffective teachers
to remain in the classroom, thereby depriving students of equal educational
opportunities.331 Plaintiffs put forth general evidence to substantiate the
causal connection between teacher quality and educational outcomes, as
well as evidence that tenure presents barriers to the removal of teachers.332
But the state appellate court rejected plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning that
plaintiffs failed to show that tenure policies had systematically resulted in
the retention of grossly ineffective teachers or that these teachers whom
tenure protected were concentrated in particular schools.333
Demonstrating a systematic problem in regard to school discipline
should be simple. Evidence of substantial numbers of districts and/or
schools with unusually high discipline rates is readily available in many
states. While an acceptable or appropriate suspension rate is an elusive
concept, the 2011–12 national suspension rate of 10%—which still is well
above rates from the 1970s and 1980s—offers a reasonable if not
conservative baseline for the purposes of this Article.334 In South Carolina,
for instance, plaintiffs might point to the fact that one out of five schools
have suspension rates that are double or more than double the national
average.335 And about twenty schools have suspension rates so high—from
50 to more than 100 percent—that relatively few students in those schools
escape punishment over the course of the year.336 Analogous systematically
high rates can be found in several other states.337

331

Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), as modified 2016 WL 4443590
(Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2016), reh’g denied, 2016 WL 4443590 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016).
332
Id. at *5–6.
333
Id. at *15–16.
334
See LOSEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (identifying the national rate). Relying on the average
suspension rate is also consistent with the findings that suspension rates below average are associated
with modest increases in student achievement, but that suspension rates above the average are
associated with substantial decreases in student achievement. Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1076.
335
Search Student Expulsion and Suspension Data, School Year 2009–10, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 4,
2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew/qc/2013/search-ocrdata.html [https://perma.cc/5F67-WRLV].
336
Id.
337
In 2009, for instance, approximately one out of three school districts in Alabama had high
school suspension rates of 20% or higher. Calculations based on Elementary and Secondary School
Suspension Rates by State, Spreadsheet: Secondary Trends 2011–12, CTR. CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES,
http://www.schooldisciplinedata.org/ccrr/resultsstate.php?us_state=AL&searchtype=raceonly&numStat
e=1 [https://perma.cc/75BD-4REK]. In North Carolina, one out of four districts fell in this category. Id.;
see also LOSEN ET AL, supra note 2, at 23–24 tbl.7 (listing twenty-two states with statewide suspension
rates in excess of 10% in secondary schools).
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The more complicated question is whether the systematic use of
suspension and its effects are substantial enough to amount to the
difference between delivering an adequate and inadequate education.
Because current social science studies are rarely framed in these
constitutional terms, they do not explicitly answer the question. The
studies’ findings, however, strongly suggest that schools with unusually
high discipline rates deprive students of an adequate or equal education.
For instance, Morris and Perry’s study showed that average students made
significant academic progress over the course of two years, but that
students suspended once actually regressed.338 Similarly, a West Virginia
Department of Education study of its own data found that students “with
one or more discipline referrals were 2.4 times more likely to score below
proficiency in math than those with no discipline referrals; math
proficiency among these students exhibited a 40 percentage point
deficit.”339 Moreover, “[a]s the number of discipline referrals increased so
did the odds of . . . scor[ing] below proficiency.”340 As a measure of
whether students are receiving an adequate education, courts frequently ask
whether substantial numbers of students are achieving below grade level.341
For these students regressing rather than progressing, and at increased risk
of scoring below proficient, the answer should easily be yes,342 and when
the suspension rate rises to 20% or 30% in particular schools and districts
across a state, this substantial harm occurs systematically.
As emphasized in Part III, the harms of harsh discipline extend
beyond just the suspended student. One study found that “[a]fter
accounting for the influence of a school’s poverty rate, out-of-school
suspension is the next strongest predictor of [a school’s overall]
achievement. . . .”343 Other studies would suggest that the systematic effects
of high suspension rates on students who do not misbehave is substantial.
As Perry and Morris wrote, in schools with above average suspension rates,
the “adverse effect of school suspension [on non-suspended students]
338

Morris & Perry, supra note 236, at 79–81.
ANDY WHISMAN & PATRICIA CAHAPE HAMMER, W. VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE ASSOCIATION
BETWEEN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE: A CASE FOR POSITIVE DISCIPLINE
APPROACHES, at v (2014), http://wvde.state.wv.us/research/reports2014/TheAssociationBetweenSchool
DisciplineandMathematicsPerformance2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNJ9-WWDG].
340
Id.
341
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 693 A.2d 417, 427–29 (N.J. 1997) (discussing achievement on
standardized state tests and its relevance to the constitutionality of the school system); CFE II,
801 N.E.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 2003); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d. 365, 382 (N.C. 2004).
342
Moreover, Morris and Perry’s study showed that suspended students were already achieving at
levels below other students prior to their suspension. Morris & Perry, supra note 236, at 79–81. Rather
than assist these students in making academic progress, suspension compounds the problem.
343
RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 20.
339
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becomes especially pronounced. . . .”344 In schools with high suspension
rates but otherwise low levels of violence, “the predicted percentile score in
reading achievement decreases from about 54th at the mean level of
suspension to 28th at very high levels of suspension. . . .”345 Likewise,
Arum and Velez’s study emphasized that while a large achievement gap
exists between high- and low-poverty schools, the gap is most pronounced
between schools with orderly and disorderly disciplinary environments.346
They further found that the achievement gap between high- and lowpoverty schools dissipates (after controlling for other factors) when the
disciplinary environment is orderly. For the purposes of this Article,
discipline’s effect on the achievement gap is crucial, as courts regularly cite
statewide achievement gaps between minority students and whites, lowincome students and middle-income students, and high-poverty schools and
low-poverty schools as evidence of a deprivation of an adequate and equal
education.347
In sum, statewide and school-level data on suspension rates combined
with available social science can demonstrate that discipline policies have
systemic and substantial effects on the delivery of an adequate and equal
education. Substantial percentages of schools and districts suspend students
well in excess of the national average. Once those suspension rates exceed
the average, higher suspension rates correlate with lower academic
achievement. That academic achievement is substantially lower for both
the suspended and nonsuspended student and is of the sort courts have
previously deemed as evidence of a constitutional harm.
4. State Responsibility for Discipline.—In addition to showing that
some policy or practice has a causal effect on educational outcomes,
plaintiffs must show state responsibility for the policy or practice.348 For
344

Perry & Morris, supra note 11, at 1077.
Id.
346
See, e.g., Arum & Velez, supra note 33.
347
See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 488–89 (Ark. 2002)
(stating that test scores are a “serious problem”); Montoy v. State, 2003 WL 22902963, at *47 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (“Kansas test results are informative and disturbingly telling.”); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 197 (Ky. 1989) (“[A]chievement test scores in the poorer
districts are lower than those in the richer districts and expert opinion clearly established that there is a
correlation between those scores and the wealth of the district.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont III), 794 A.2d 744, 752 (N.H. 2002); CFE I, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo.
1995) (identifying assessments as an element of adequacy, but finding low test scores alone do not
indicate inadequacy). But see James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2008) (questioning the heavy reliance on test scores).
348
See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 335 (N.Y. 2003) (“[P]laintiffs had to show that insufficient
funding led to inadequate inputs which led to unsatisfactory results.”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State,
599 S.E.2d 365, 386 (N.C. 2004) (“It is one thing for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a large number of
345
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instance, a plaintiff might demonstrate that a school district has low-quality
teaching and that the instruction depresses academic outcomes, but the
reasons for low-quality teaching might be numerous.349 In many instances,
the reasons are directly related to state level policy, such as insufficient
state funding to recruit, retain, and train teachers.350 In other instances, the
reasons may be related to poor local implementation, such as wasting state
funds on ineffective programs. In other instances, the reasons could have
little to do with state policy or local implementation, but could be the result
of some other outside factor, such as a longstanding community
controversy over religion, gender, race, or politics. The key here is to show
that the state is the cause of the harms that students suffer, not some factor
beyond the state’s control or responsibility.
In the context of discipline, while disorderly environments and high
suspension rates may have causal effects on educational quality, plaintiffs
would also need to demonstrate that the state was the cause of these
disciplinary problems (unless the claim is only against the local school
district). This causal showing will generate fierce disputes between
plaintiffs and the state. Almost as a matter of standard practice in school
quality and finance cases, the state disputes the causal connection between
its policies and the educational outcomes plaintiffs are challenging. First,
states have sought to rebut the notion that state funding policy is causally
connected to educational quality or outcomes.351 States argue that
educational outcomes are more directly a product of student demographic
variables and student effort.352 Second, states have argued that, to the extent
money matters, the state has provided districts with sufficient funds and

Hoke County students are failing to obtain a sound, basic public education. It is quite another for
plaintiffs to show that such a failure is primarily the result of action and/or inaction of the State . . . .”).
349
For a full discussion of the complex and various causes of low quality teaching, see Derek W.
Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2016).
350
See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 334.
351
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1973) (questioning
whether “there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of
education”); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (recognizing dispute over whether and how
money matters); see also Rebell, supra note 21, at 1484–85 (“[W]hether money matters in education
was directly considered by the state courts in thirty [school funding cases]. In twenty-nine of them, the
courts determined that money does indeed matter.”).
352
Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287 (Conn. 1996) (“[D]efendants stress . . . the significant
role that adverse socioeconomic conditions play”); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 341 (arguing against the idea
that “children come to the New York City schools ineducable, unfit to learn”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
599 S.E.2d at 386 (“[T]he State contended that the evidence showed . . . [t]hat if a cognizable group of
students within Hoke County are failing to obtain a sound basic education, it is due to factors other than
the educational offerings provided by the State.”).
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that the problem is local mismanagement.353 For the most part, courts
deciding these issues on the merits have rejected these arguments, but these
issues are still contested today.354
The debate surrounding discipline would be no less intense, but the
causal analysis potentially cleaner. The connection between disciplinary
environments and educational outcomes is arguably stronger than the
connection between money and education outcomes. With money, much
depends on local variables and on how districts spend that money; thus, the
connection between money and educational outcomes is far from
absolute.355 But discipline policy appears to have a more direct effect on
educational outcomes than money.356 With that said, creating a positive
disciplinary environment and effectively reducing suspensions calls for a
more complex remedy than just an increase in state funding.
This last point would offer the state a second opening to challenge its
causal responsibility. In particular, the state might claim that students
and/or misguided teachers, administrators, and school boards are the cause
of misbehavior and negative environments. Shifting blame to students has
obvious appeal. As noted in Section II.B, some courts already instinctively
blame students and reason that suspensions and expulsions do not warrant
heightened scrutiny because misbehaving students forfeit their education
rights.357 In the context of a school quality or equality claim, however,
shifting blame to students is more difficult because the claim would be
brought on behalf of not only misbehaving students, but innocent
bystanders. On this basis, both the logic and rhetorical value of shifting
blame onto students would disappear. Studies also indicate the state is
simply wrong on the facts. While student misbehavior is a product of
individual choice, it is heavily influenced by context.358 Schools that foster

353

Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting argument that state
caused “no more than 10 to 30 percent” of disparities); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 343 (arguing that
“inefficient management of personnel is the supervening cause . . . rather than the funding system”).
354
Rebell, supra note 21, at 1486 (“Only one court has clearly held that money does not matter.”).
355
See generally Black, supra note 323, at 1762–63 (discussing the variables in school funding and
how they complicate causal questions).
356
Compare BRUCE D. BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT AGE-OLD QUESTION:
DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION? 6 (2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED528632.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RT2-CBU9] (finding in new studies “a positive, statistically significant (though at
times small) relationship between student achievement gains and financial inputs”), with Perry &
Morris, supra note 11, at 1077 (indicating the effect of discipline on student achievement is “especially
pronounced”).
357
Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); Kolesnick ex rel. Shaw v.
Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 558 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Neb. 1997); In re RM, 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004)
(“[S]tudent can[] temporarily forfeit educational services through his own conduct.”).
358
See, e.g., RAUSCH & SKIBA, supra note 8, at 22; Wu et al., supra note 253.
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negative policies and climates, in effect, cause a certain percentage of
additional misbehavior and a certain percentage of lower achievement.359
So long as a court accepted the evidence that school climate influences
behavior and academics, plaintiffs should be able to establish the causal
connection between state policy, school discipline, and educational
outcomes.
A state’s claim that local school actors are to blame should be even
easier to reject. As prior courts have emphasized, the duty to ensure an
adequate or equal education ultimately rests on the state.360 If problematic
decisions or circumstances are occurring locally, the state has a
responsibility to identify and correct them.361 The discipline problem in
many districts does not stem from bad actors per se. It often results from a
lack of capacity to deal constructively with and understand the causes of
misbehavior.362 In this respect, local discipline policies are directly tied to
the support the state provides—or fails to provide.
Insofar as school climate and discipline are central to educational
outcomes, they are part of the educational program the state must support
and fund, just as it would teacher training and certification programs and
requirements. With discipline, however, many states have incentivized and
mandated harsh responses to discipline rather than supporting more
constructive approaches. For instance, in South Carolina, state statutes
authorize schools to suspend or expel students for the violation of any
school board rule,363 with no suggestion that better alternatives are
available. Likewise, in Mississippi, a state statute authorizes districts to
expel students after three instances of “disruptive behavior.”364 Those states
that do not mandate or directly incentivize harsh discipline responses
delegate so much discretion to local districts that nothing restrains those
districts from making bad decisions.

359

See, e.g., ARUM, supra note 241, at 182 (finding students more willing to defy authority in
overly harsh discipline regimes); Ma & Willms, supra note 273, at 170 (finding student behavior varied
based on school characteristics).
360
Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he sole
responsibility for providing the system of common schools lies with the General Assembly.”); CFE II,
801 N.E.2d 326, 344 (N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he State has ultimate responsibility for the schools . . . .”); Hoke
Cty. Bd of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389 (N.C. 2004) (holding state ultimately responsible for the
education local school boards provide).
361
Supra note 360.
362
IRA
GLASS,
538:
IS
THIS
WORKING?
(Oct.
17,
2014)
(transcript),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/538/transcript [https://perma.cc/9ABN-BR8H]
(revealing through discussions with teachers that many of them are just winging it).
363
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-210(A) (2013) (authorizing expulsion for the violation of any school
board rule).
364
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-18.1 (2014) (authorizing expulsion for disruptive students).
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Either way, responsibility for high levels of suspension and expulsion
falls on the state. On the one hand, the state actively promotes problematic
discipline environments with statutes of the sort described above. On the
other, it ignores the importance of maintaining a positive and supportive
disciplinary environment and leaves its agents—school districts and
administrators—to fend for themselves. In both instances, the state is
creating the conditions for negative discipline environments to occur. Thus,
the response to a state’s attempt to cast blame on districts would be simple:
the state is both vicariously and directly responsible for negative climates
that persist in school districts.365
5. Viable Remedies.—Courts may require plaintiffs to demonstrate
the state can actually fix the identified problems. Here, many of the issues
that came up with causation can resurface. For instance, even if the state is
responsible for the conditions that incentivize bad behavior, what, if any,
tools does the state have to actually improve school climates and reduce
student misbehavior? The short answer is that while the state cannot stop
misbehavior altogether, research shows that it has tools to minimize it.
The research on alternatives to school exclusion consistently shows
that states can improve climates and reduce misbehavior. First, as Jason
Nance writes in his review of the literature, “[p]erhaps the most important
initiative that lawmakers can support and educators can implement . . . [to
avoid] extreme disciplinary measures is to improve the strength and quality
of classroom activities and the classroom management skills of teachers.”366
This remedial step, again, points back to the fundamental connection
between educational quality and discipline outcomes.
Second, states can adopt discipline programs that are explicitly nonpunitive. States can do this through one of two major categorical
approaches: restorative justice, or positive behavioral supports and
interventions. Restorative justice is premised on the notion that when a
student misbehaves, the student harms others in the school community.
Rather than punish the student, restorative justice asks that the student
communicate with those he or she has harmed and identify ways to repair
the harm and resolve any conflict. Studies have shown that these programs

365

This is not to say that states have uniformly ignored the problem. Some have taken important
first steps in the direction this Article proposes. See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTORATIVE
PRACTICES, http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/dse/safe/clim/prac/ [https://perma.cc/RRH2-C6U4].
Regardless of whether these steps are sufficient to resolve the discipline problem in a particular state,
the fact that some have demonstrates the ability of other states to do the same.
366
Nance, supra note 14, at 346.
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can dramatically reduce the incidence of interpersonal conflicts in schools
and improve the overall environment as a result.367
Positive behavioral intervention and support programs “aim[] to alter
the school environment by creating improved systems (e.g., discipline,
reinforcement, data management) and procedures (e.g., office referral,
training, leadership) that promote positive change in staff behaviors, which
subsequently alter[s] student behaviors.”368 More particularly, school
personnel are trained on how to develop constructive behavior
interventions, promote positive learning environments, reward appropriate
student behavior, and apply these rewards and interventions consistently
across time.369 Studies show that positive behavioral support systems can
improve student behavior and achievement.370 This approach has proven so
effective that the U.S. Department of Education has created a technical
assistance center to help schools implement the program and has endorsed
it as a remedy in schools with disproportionately high suspension and
expulsion rates for minority students.371
To be clear, a number of schools have already adopted these
programs, and some states have established programs to assist these
districts.372 But the state must do much more than offer technical assistance
and wait on districts to voluntarily adopt these programs. States must
actively fund and require transitions to new disciplinary environments in
those schools where discipline is impeding the delivery of equal and
adequate educational opportunities. Moreover, state involvement is
367

See, e.g., MARILYN ARMOUR, ED WHITE MIDDLE SCHOOL RESTORATIVE DISCIPLINE
EVALUATION: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 23–30, https://irjrd.org/files/2016/01/Ed-WhiteEvaluation-2012-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4DB-GF3S]; MYRIAM L. BAKER, DPS RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE PROJECT: YEAR THREE 9–17 (2009); INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, IMPROVING
SCHOOL CLIMATE: FINDINGS FROM SCHOOLS IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE PRACTICES 6 (2009)
http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/IIRP-Improving-School-Climate-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KP2-F496]; L.A.
UNIFIED
SCH.
DIST.,
RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
IN
ACTION
(Oct.
28,
2014),
https://boe.lausd.net/sites/default/files/10-28-14SSCRestorativeJusticeInAction.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G9RX-YTHG]; see also Patricia Leigh Brown, Opening Up, Students Transform a Vicious Circle, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/education/restorative-justice-programstake-root-in-schools.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G57F-SZPZ].
368
Bradshaw et al., supra note 154, at 134.
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Nance, supra note 14, at 357–59.
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See, e.g., Bradshaw et al., supra note 154, at 139–40; Douglas A. Cheney et al., A 2-Year
Outcome Study of the Check, Connect, and Expect Intervention for Students at Risk for Severe Behavior
Problems, 17 J. OF EMOTIONAL AND BEHAV. DISORDERS 226, 226–43 (2009); Robert Horner et al., A
Randomized Control Trial of School-Wide Positive Behavior Support in Elementary Schools. 11 J.
POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 133, 133–44 (2009).
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U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, Technical Assistance Center on
Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, https://www.pbis.org/ [https://perma.cc/T8ZW-5P8N];
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 19.
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See, e.g., Bradshaw et al., supra note 154, at 134 (indicating that 9000 districts had adopted
positive behavioral supports).
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necessary to ensure that the programs are implemented properly. Research
has shown that to be effective, the programs must be implemented carefully
over an extended period of time.373
Whether a court would specifically require any particular program is
uncertain. After deciding the first four elements in plaintiffs’ claim (duty,
harm, causation, responsibility), courts might direct the state, within its
discretion, to enact a reasonable remedy.374 Only if the state refuses to
implement a reasonable remedy will courts be more proscriptive.375
Regardless, the state would have a relatively clear set of remedial options:
ensuring funding for local school districts to develop and implement their
own discipline improvement plans; officially endorsing some non-punitive
approach to discipline, such as positive behavioral supports; monitoring
discipline data to identify problematic districts and schools and specifically
targeting remedies there; and/or changing the statutory structure for school
discipline to reduce reliance on suspension and expulsion.
C. Pros and Cons of a Systemic Duty-Based Approach to Discipline
Versus an Individual Rights Approach
While the two legal theories for reforming school discipline theories
are not mutually exclusive, they are very different in form and evidence.
The theory that the deprivation of education through suspension triggers
heightened scrutiny is more individual in nature, whereas the theory that
problematic disciplinary environments interfere with quality education is
group-based. As such, they would involve very different types of evidence
and legal framing. There are advantages to each.
The advantage of the individual right to education is its relative
simplicity. First, as described in Part II, the questions to be answered are all
doctrinal. The cases could potentially proceed on the briefs without even
resorting to evidentiary trials.376 Second, the answers to the doctrinal
373

Bradshaw et al., supra note 154 (comparing fully implemented and trained programs to others);
Nance, supra note 14, at 355–56 (emphasizing that restorative justice involves cultural change that does
not happen quickly and requires sustained effort over three to five years).
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See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989) (“The General
Assembly must provide adequate funding for the system. How they do this is their decision.”); Hoke
Cty. Bd of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 395 (N.C. 2004) (“[P]roviding specific remedies for
violations [of the right to education] . . . is within [the executive and legislative branch’s] primary
domain.”).
375
Abbott IV, 710 A.2d 450, 458–61 (N.J. 1998); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238
(Wyo. 1995).
376
In the few cases litigated thus far, the facts have involved only one or two students, been
uncontested, and barely even warranted discussion in the courts’ final opinions. In fact, the courts’
description of the misbehavior was vague at best in several cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of
Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Mass. 1995) (indicating the student had a blade in lipstick case); King ex
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questions would, of course, be contested, but if a court recognized an
individual right to education, heightened scrutiny would follow and
plaintiffs’ claims would almost automatically fall into place, as the burden
would shift to the state. Third, the remedies would, likewise, be simple and
immediate. Insofar as suspension and expulsion were overly broad
responses under certain circumstances, a court could simply prohibit them
or hold that schools must specifically justify them. In short, this individual
claim offers the potential of quick, concrete victories.
The individual claim’s weaknesses, however, are the systemic claim’s
strengths. While victory in individual claims might trigger broader
substantive reforms, the remedies could just as easily be limited and
potentially make matters worse. Schools could just stop suspending
students without making any other changes,377 which could make schools
more dysfunctional.378 If the underlying environment remains problematic,
students will continue to misbehave and their numbers will increase.
School officials, moreover, would blame courts for saddling them with
problem students that the officials believe should be suspended or
expelled.379 In short, strict scrutiny could lead to blunt remedies that fail to
address the fundamental challenges in school discipline.
In contrast, a school quality claim would focus exclusively on the
fundamental problems in school discipline and force substantive reform of
schools’ disciplinary environment. This type of reform may be more
palatable to both courts and schools. Because the focus is on improving
school quality, not simply prohibiting suspensions, teachers and schools are
more likely to favorably perceive it.380 Courts’ perceptions are also likely
different because, unlike the individual right claim, it would not pit
misbehaving students against others. It would also moot the forfeiture
theory. In this context, courts would be asked to ensure quality education,
not block the punishment of misbehaving students.
Finally, ensuring quality or equal education would not require courts
to answer new doctrinal issues. Courts would only need to incorporate the
rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 261 (N.C. 2010) (only indicating a
fight involving multiple students occurred).
377
This was the explicit concern in King.
378
King, 704 S.E.2d at 264 (speculating that applying strict scrutiny would jeopardize the safety of
schools).
379
According to Arum, see supra note 241, this was the response to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
380
See Kevin McCorry, Philly District Orders School Police to Stay Out of Level 1 Offenses,
NEWSWORKS (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/education/66215-phillydistrict-orders-school-police-to-stay-out-of-level-1-offenses [https://perma.cc/W6TX-3ZTF] (discussing
teachers’ negative response to basic prohibitions on referrals to law enforcement in Philadelphia
because new policy did not address other underlying problems).
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empirical evidence into existing doctrinal frameworks. This empirical
evidence would also more clearly signal a positive end result, whereas the
individual claim potentially asks courts to break new doctrinal ground and
strike down practices with no assurance that what replaces them will
improve education. In sum, the educational quality claim would make the
most impact. The only significant drawback is that the litigation itself
would be far more time- and resource-intensive, involving extensive social
science evidence, state-wide analysis of discipline outcomes, connecting
discipline data to academic outcomes, and establishing that this empirical
evidence is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, precedent developed in school funding and
quality litigation has generated nothing less than a rights revolution in state
constitutional law. That rights revolution, however, has had almost no
impact on the current crisis in school discipline. This disconnect is striking.
In states where education is a constitutional or fundamental right, one
would expect schools to be far more careful in suspending and expelling
students. Likewise, empirical evidence increasingly demonstrates that
school discipline policy and educational quality are inextricably linked.
Yet, both courts and policymakers treat them as separate issues.
In their defense, momentous precedential changes can take years to
absorb. School finance litigation went through its own developmental
phase from the early 1970s into the 1990s. In some states, it is still
developing. Discipline litigation has yet to experience this development
and scholars have done very little to theorize it.
A constitutional right to education and the duties it imposes on the
state should completely reframe how courts look at discipline. But the
absence of school finance opinions explicitly linking education rights and
quality to discipline has slowed this recognition. The path forward is
twofold. First, courts must directly answer the question of whether the
general constitutional duties and rights developed in school finance
litigation also create an individual interest in education that, when taken
away, triggers heightened scrutiny. All signals and logic indicate the
answer should be yes. Second, litigants and courts must move beyond an
individualized concept of discipline and focus on how discipline policy and
practice interfere with the state’s duty to deliver adequate and equal
educational opportunities. The very quality of education students receive in
a school will be largely a function of the disciplinary environment in the
school. The disciplinary environment in many of the lowest achieving
schools is also the most dysfunctional. In these schools, discipline
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reform—not just academic reform—is a necessary intervention to ensure
adequate and equal educational opportunities.
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